Book 2
The Athenians having closely pursued them, and taken twelve ships, picking up most of the men from them, and putting them on board their own vessels, sailed off to Molycrium;
and after erecting a trophy at Rhium, and dedicating a ship to Neptune, they returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also immediately coasted along with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and Cnemus and the ships that were at Leucas, which were to have formed a junction with these, came thence, after the battle at Stratus, to the same port.
Then the Lacedaemonians sent to the fleet, as counsellors to Cnemus, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron; commanding him to make preparations for a second engagement more successful than the former, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very different from what they might have expected;
(particularly as it was the first sea-fight they had attempted;) and they thought that it was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there had been some cowardice [on the part of the admiral]; for they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own short practice of naval matters. They despatched them therefore in anger;
and on their arrival they sent round, in conjunction with Cnemus, orders for ships to be furnished by the different states, while they refitted those they already had, with a view to an engagement.
Phormio too, on the other hand, sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their preparations, and to tell them of the victory they had [themselves] gained; at the same time desiring them to send him quickly the largest possible number of ships, for lie was in daily expectation of an immediate engagement. They despatched to him twenty;
but gave additional orders to the commander of them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was their proxenus, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, telling them that he would reduce it under their power; for it was at present hostile to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that he might oblige the Polichnitae, who bordered on the Cydonians.
The commander therefore of the squadron went with it to Crete, and in conjunction with the Polichnitae laid waste the territory of the Cydonians; and wasted no little time in the country, owing to adverse winds and the impossibility of putting to sea.
During the time that the Athenians were thus detained on the coast of Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, having made their preparations for an engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achaea, where the land-force of the Peloponnesians had come to support them.
Phormio, too, coasted along to the Rhium near Molycrium, and dropped anchor outside of it, with twenty ships, the same as he had before fought with.
This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; the other, namely, that in the Peloponnese, is opposite to it; the distance between the two being about seven stades of sea, which forms the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf.
At the Rhium in Achaea, then, being not far from Panormus, where their land-force was, the Peloponnesians also came to anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw that the Athenians had done the same.
And for six or seven days they lay opposite each other, practising and preparing for the battle; the Peloponnesians intending not to sail beyond the Rhia into the open sea, for they were afraid of a disaster like the former; the Athenians, not to sail into the straits, for they bought that fighting in a confined space was in favour of the enemy.
Afterwards Cnemus, and Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement as quickly as they could, before any reinforcement came from Athens, assembled the men first; and seeing the greater part of them frightened in consequence of their former defeat, and not eager for the battle, they cheered them by speaking as follows:
The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if owing to it any one be afraid of this before us, affords no just Literally, "no ground for drawing this conclusion, so as to alarm him;' the infinitive τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι being explanatory of τέκμαρσιν. grounds for his alarm. For it was deficient, as you know, in preparation;
and we were sailing not so much for a naval engagement as for a land expedition. It happened too that not a few of the chances of war were against us; while partly, perhaps, our inexperience caused our failure, as it was our first battle by sea. It was not then through our cowardice that we experienced the defeat;
nor is it right that our spirits, which were not crushed by force, but still retain a measure of Ἀντιλογίαν is opposed to "the acknowledgment of our own defeat,' and signifies literally making answer; maintaining the quarrel. —Arnold Compare the use of our word controversy, by which it may generally be rendered, in Shakspeare's Julius Caesar. The torrent roar'd, and we did buffet itWith lusty sinews; throwing it aside,And stemming it with hearts of controversy. defiance to the enemy, should lose their edge from the result of that mishap. We should rather think, that men may indeed be overthrown by mere chances, but that in spirit the same men ought always to be brave; and that while their courage remains, they cannot reasonably on any occasion act like cowards under the cloak of inexperience.
In your case, however, you are not so far inferior to the enemy, even through your inexperience, as you are superior to him in daring. As for their skill, of which you are most afraid, if indeed it be joined with courage, it will also be accompanied with presence of mind in danger to execute what it has learned; but without gallantry no art whatever is of any avail in the face of perils. For fear banishes presence of mind; and art without bravery is good for nothing.
Against their greater experience then put your own greater daring; against your fear in consequence of your defeat put the fact of your having then been unprepared;
and there is in your favour a clear balance of superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast in the presence of your heavy-armed; and victory, generally speaking, declares for those who are the more numerous and better appointed.
On no one single ground then do we find it probable that we should be defeated. As for the blunders we committed before, the very fact of their having been committed will now teach us a lesson.
With good courage, therefore, both steersmen and sailors, do every man your own duty, without leaving the post assigned to each.
And we will prepare for the engagement not worse than your former commanders; and will give no one any excuse for being a coward: but if any one should wish to be one, he shall be visited with the punishment he deserves; while the brave shall be honoured with the rewards befitting their bravery.
Such was the exhortation given to the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio, on the other hand, being also alarmed at the apprehensions of his men, and perceiving that they formed in groups amongst themselves, and showed their fears of the superior numbers of the ships opposed to them, wished to assemble and cheer them, and offer them some advice at the present juncture.
For before this he always used to tell them, and prepare their minds for the conviction, that there was no number of ships whatever so great that they ought not to face it, if it sailed against them; and his men had for a long time entertained this resolution, that from no multitude of Peloponnesian ships whatever would they, Athenians as they were, retire.
Seeing them, however, at that time out of spirits, he wished to remind them of their former confidence, and therefore called them together, and addressed them as follows:
Seeing you, my men, alarmed at the numbers of your opponents, I have called you together; as I do not wish you to be in dread of what is not really to be feared.
For these men, in the first place, because they have been previously conquered by us, and do not even themselves think that they are a match for us, have equipped this great number of ships, and not such as would be merely equal to ours. Then, for the fact on which they chiefly rely in coming against us—that it is their natural character to be courageous—they feel this confidence for no other reason than because they are generally successful owing to their experience in land-service;
and they think For an explanation of the confused construction in this passage, see Arnold's note. it will do the same for them at sea. But this, in all reason, will rather be our advantage now, as it is theirs in that case: for in valour they are not at all superior to us;
but from our being respectively more experienced in one particular service, we are also more confident respecting it. Moreover, the Lacedaemonians lead their allies from regard to their own glory, and bring the greater part of them into dangers against their will;
else, [without such compulsion,] they would have never dared to fight again by sea, after being so decidedly beaten. Do not then be afraid of their boldness. It is you that cause them a much greater and better-founded alarm, both on the ground of your having previously conquered them, and because they think we should not have faced them if we did not mean to do something worthy our decisive victory.
For when equal to their opponents, men generally come against them, as these do, trusting to their power rather than to their spirit; but those who dare to meet them with far inferior resources, and yet without being compelled, do so because they have the strong assurance of their own resolution.
From this consideration these men fear us more for the inequality of our preparations, than they would have done for more proportionate ones. Many armies, too, have ere now been overthrown by an inferior force through want of skill, and others through want of daring;
with neither of which have we now any thing to do. As for the battle, I will not, if I can help, fight it in the strait; nor will I sail in there at all; being aware that for a few skilfully managed and fast-sailing vessels, against a large number unskilfully managed, want of sea-room is a disadvantage. For one could neither sail up as he ought to the charge, without having a view of the enemy from a distance; nor retire at the proper time, if hard-pressed; and there is no breaking through the line, nor returning to a second charge—which are the manoeuvres of the better-sailing vessels—but the sea-fight must in that case become a land-fight; and then the greater number of ships gain the superiority.
On these points ther I will exercise as much forethought as possible; and do you, remaining in good order in your ships, be quick in receiving the word of command; especially as our post of observation is at so short a distance: and during the action attach the greatest imporance to order and silence, which is of service for operations of war in general, and for a naval engagement more particularly: and repel these your enemies in a manner worthy of your former achievements.
Great indeed is the struggle in which you are engaged, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesians as regards their navy, or to bring nearer home to the Athenians apprehensions for the command of the sea.
Again I remind you that you have already conquered the greater part of them; and the spirits of defeated men will not be what they were, in the face of the same dangers.
Such was the exhortation that Phormio, on his side, addressed to his men. Now when the Athenians did not sail into the narrow part of the gulf to meet them, the Peloponnesians, wishing to lead them on even against their will, weighed in the morning, and having formed their ships in a column four abreast, sailed to their own land towards the inner part of the gulf, with the right wing taking the lead, in which position also they lay at anchor.
In this wing they had placed their twenty best sailers; that if Phormio, supposing them to be sailing against Naupactus, should himself also coast along in that direction to relieve the place, the Athenians might not, by getting outside their wing, escape their advance against them, but that these ships might shut them in.
As they expected, he was alarmed for the place in its unprotected state; and when he saw them under weigh, against his will, and in great haste too, he embarked his crews and sailed along shore;