Book 1
For do not regard their land as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better hostage the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to deal with.
For if, without adequate preparation, egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course which might ratheri.e. than the opposite course. result in disgrace and difficulties for the Peloponnesus.
For complaints, indeed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, may possibly be adjusted; but when a whole confederacy, for the sake of individual interests, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to end it with honour.
"And let no man think it pusillanimous that many states should hesitate to attack a single city.
For they also have allies not less numerous than ours who pay tribute; and war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone that makes arms serviceable, especially when an inland opposes a maritime power.
Let us therefore provide ourselves with money first, instead of being carried away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies; and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences, whether for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to get some forecast of them.
"And so be not ashamed of the slowness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most; for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending, because you went into the war without preparation, and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest fame.
And, after all, this trait in us may well be in the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by reason of it we alone do not become insolent in prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others do; and when men try to goad us by praise into dangerous enterprises against our better judgment, we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if anyone goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action by invective, we are none the more moved to compliance through vexation.
Indeed, it is because of our orderly temperThe speaker uses εὔκοσμομ, rather than βραδύ employed by the critics of Sparta, to suggest the contrast with impulsiveness or undue haste. that we are brave in war and wise in counsel—brave in war, because self-control is the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self, in turn, is the chief element in courage; and wise in counsel, because we are educated too rudely to despise the laws and with too much severity of discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ultraclever in useless accomplishmentsWith a glance at the Athenians' attention to culture, especially the art of elegant speech. as to disparage our enemy's military preparations in brave words and then fail to go through with the business with corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the designs of our neighbours are very much like our own and that what may befall from fortunecf. the Corinthians' charge, Thuc. 1.69.6, that the Spartans trusted to chance. cannot be determined by speeches.
But it is our way always to make our preparations'by deeds, on the presumption that we go against opponents who are wise in counsel; and we ought never to build our hopes on the chance that they are going to make mistakes, but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe precautions. And we must not believe that man differs much from man,cf. the Corinthians' praise of Athenian superiority, Thuc. 1.70. but that he is best who is trained in the severest discipline.
"These are the practices which our fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have maintained fiom the beginning to our profit; let us not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which involves many lives, much money, many cities and a good name; but let us deliberate at our leisure.
And this course is permitted to us more than to the supporters of the other view because of our strength. And send envoys to the Athenians to take up the question of Potidaea, and also to take up the matters wherein our allies claim that they are wronged. The chief reason for this is that they are readycf. Thuc. 1.78.4. to submit to arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith against one who offers arbitration as though against a wrong-doer. But all the while prepare yourselves for the war.
This decision will be best for yourselves and will inspire most fear in your foes." Thus spoke Archidamus, and finally Sthenelaidas, one of the ephors at that time, came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows:
"The long speeches of the Athenians I cannot understand; for though they indulged in much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus. And yet, if they conducted themselves well against the Persians in former times but are now conducting themselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold punishment, because they used to be good and have become bad.
But we are the same now as we were then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not permit our allies to be wronged or even put off avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put off suffering them.
Others, indeed, may have money in abundance and ships and horses,cf. Thuc. 1.80.3. but we have brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to the Athenians; nor must we seek redress by means of legal processes and words when it is not in word only that we ourselves are being injured, but we must avenge them speedily and with all our might.
And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate when a wrong is being done us; nay, it befits rather those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a long time.
Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not permit the Athenians to become too great; and let us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer."
When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken, he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians.
Now in their voting they usually decide by shout and not by ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distinguish which shout was the louder, and wishing to make the assembly more eager for war by a clear demonstration of their sentiment, he said: "Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the other side." Then they rose and divided,
and those who thought the treaty had been broken were found to be in a large majority.
Then they called in the allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athenians were doing wrong, but that they wished to summon the whole body of the alliesA general convocation of the allies; at this time only part of them had been invited, according to Thuc. 1.. See Thuc. 1.119 , where the plan is carried out. and put the vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate together and together undertake the war, if it should be so decided.
And so the allies who were there went back home, having brought these matters to a settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later, after they had finished the business on which they had come.
This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year445 B.c. from the beginning of the thirty years' truce, which was made after the Euboean war.Thuc. 1.114.
And the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had been broken and tliat they must go to war was determined, not so much by the influence of the speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Hellas was already subject to them.
For it was in the following manner that the Athenians found themselves face to face with those circumstances in dealing with which they rose to greatness.
When the Persians had retreated from Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hellenes,At Salamis, Plataea, Mycale. and those of them who with their ships had taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, wh1o was commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with the allies from the Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, together with the allies fiom Ionia and the Hellespont,The contingents from the islands and the coast of Asia Minor, who, in consequences of the battle at Mycale and the advance of the victors to Abydos, had been received into the Hellenic alliance. who were already in revolt from the King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos, which was held by the Persians; and passing the winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by the Barbarians; and after that the contingents of the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont.
But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had departed from their territory, straightway began to fetch back their wives and their children and the remnant of their household goods from where they had placed them for safety,Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen; cf. Hdt. 8.41. and to rebuild the city and the walls; for of the encircling wall only small portions were left standing, and most of the houses were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the chief men of the Persians had themselves taken quarters.
But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because they themselves would have preferred to see neither the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more because their allies urged them on through apprehension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy, which had hitherto not been large, but also of the daring they had shown in the Persian war.
So they requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing, giving no indication of their real purpose or of their suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but representing that the Barbarian, if he should attack them again, would not have any stronghold to make his base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes; the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations.
To these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss these matters, and so got rid of them without delay. Themistocles then proposed that they should send himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon; that they should then choose other ambassadors in addition, but, instead of sending them immediately, should wait until they should have raised the wall to such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence; and that the whole population of the city, men, women, and children, should take part in the wallbuilding, sparing neither private nor public edifice that would in any way help to further the work, but demolishing them all.
After he had given these instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he would himself look after matters at Sparta, he departed.
And when he came to Lacedaemon he did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept putting it off and making excuses; and whenever any one of those in authority asked why he did not come before the people, he said that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account of some urgent business; he expected them however to come soon, and wondered that they were not already there.
And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were disposed to be content with this reply by reason of their friendship for Themistocles; but when everybody who came from Athens declared quite positively that the wall was going up and was already attaining height, they did not know how to discredit it.
Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send some trustworthy men of their own number who would see for themselves and bring back a faithful report.
They did so, and Themistocles sent word secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as covertly as possible and not to let them go until they themselves returned—for by this time his colleagues, Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the wall was high enough—the reason for his precaution being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them go.
Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them frankly that the city was now walled and therefore in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate any matter with them they must hereafter come to them with the understanding that they were dealing with men who were fully aware of what was for their own and the general interest.
For when they thought it best to abandon their city and embark on their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors, upon this bold step without the advice of the Lacedaemonians, and again in all matters in which the Athenans took counsel with the Lacedaemonians they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment.
Accordingly in the present instance also it seemed to them best that their city should have a wall, and that this course would be of great advantage both to themselves in particular, and to the whole body of the allies;
for it was impossible for tlemn, he added, to have equal or similar weight in the general councils of the alliance except on the basis of a military strength that was a match for theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of the alliance should either dispense with their walls one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as justified.