Book 1
"For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that when he came again, not being able to defend ourselves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to aid one another against a fleet so numerous.
And the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army.
"Such, then, was the issue of that battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that issue we contributed the three most serviceable elements, namely, the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal. Of the four hundredProbably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. 8.48, of which the Athenian contingent (200, i.e. 180 + 20 lent to the Chalcidians, 8.1) could be spokean of as πλείους τῶν ἡμισέων or with slight exaggeration as ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν. ships our quota was a little less than two-thirds. The commander was Themistocles, who more than any other was responsible for our fighting the battle in the strait, which most surely was our salvation; and on this account you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you.See Hdt. 8.124; Plut. Them. 17.3
And the zeal we displayed was that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to help us on land, since all the rest up to our very borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even in that extremity to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or by dispersing to render ourselves useless to them, but to embark on our ships and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as great as we received;
for whereas the population of the cities from which you brought aid was still undisturbed and you could hope to possess them in the future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather than for us—at any rate you did not come near so long as we were still unharmed—we on our part, setting forth from a city that was no more,cf. the taunt of Adimantus: περὶ οὐδεμίης ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχήσεις Hdt. 8.57.7, You will fight for a country that is no more,, and the famous answer of Themistocles, ὡς εἴη καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέζων ἤπερ κείνοις ἔστ’ ἂν διηκόσιαι νέες σφι ἔωσι πεπληρωμέναι, Hdt. 8.61.8, We have a city and a country greater than yours as long as we have two hundred ships fully manned. and risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving both you and ourselves.
But if we had acted as others did, and through fear of losing our territory had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or afterwards had lacked the courage to embark on our ships, in the conviction that we were already ruined, it would from that moment have been useless for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on quietly just as he wished.
"Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account of the empire we possess ?
And indeed we did not acquire this empire by force, but only after you had refused to continue to oppose what was left of the barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of their own accord asked us to assume the leadership.
It was under the compulsion of circumstances that we were driven at first to advance our empire to its present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well;
and after we had once incurred the hatred of most of our allies, and several of them had already revolted and been reduced to subjection, and when you were no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone over to you.
And no man is to be blamed for making the most of his advantages when it is a question of the gravest dangers.
"At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in the exercise of your leadership over the Peloponnesian states regulate their politiesl according to your own advantage; and if in the Persian war you had held out to the end in the hegemony and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we did, you would certainly have become not less obnoxious to the allies than we are, and would have been compelled either to rule them with a strong hand or yourselves to risk losing the hegemony.
Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with human nature in what we also have done,just because we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and then, yielding to the strongest motives—honour, fear, and self-interest—declined to give it up. Nor, again, are we the first who have entered upon such a course, but it has ever been an established rule that the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And at the same time we thought we were worthy to rule, and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell to calculating what your interests were and resorted as you do now, to the plea of justice—which no one, when opportunity offered of securing something by main strength, ever yet put before force and abstained from taking advantage.
And they are to be commended who, yielding to the instinct of human nature to rule over others, have been more observant of justice than they might have been, considering their power.
At least, if others should seize our power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof that we show some moderation; but in our case the result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough, obloquy rather than commendation.
"For although we are at a disadvantage in suitsThese seem to have been disputes in matters of trade tried before federal courts elsewhere than in Athens; whereas τὰς κρίσεις refers to compulsory jurisdiction which Athens enforced upon her allies in her own courts. with our allies arising out of commercial agreements, and although in our own courts in Athens, where we have established tribunals, the same laws apply to us as to them, we are thought to insist too much upon our legal rights.
And none of our allies observes why it is that those who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less moderate than we are toward their subjects, are not reproached on this account. It is because those who may use might have no need to appeal to right.
But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to associate with us on the basis of equality, come off second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise, whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of being grateful that they have not been deprived of what is of greater moment,Namely, their equality before the law. they are more deeply offended because of their trifling inequality than if we had from the first put aside all legal restraints and had openly sought our own advantage.
In that case even they would not be setting up the claim that the weaker should not have to yield to the stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of injustice than of violence;
for the former, they feel, is overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they think;
and no wonder, for the present yoke is always heavy to subjects. Certainly you, should you overthrow us and obtain supremacy, would soon lose the good will which you have gained through fear of usif indeed you mean again to show such temper as you gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while you had the hegemony against the Persian.e.g. the conduct of Pausanias described in Thuc. 1.130 - Thuc. 1.133 For the institutions that prevail among you at home are incompatible with those of other peoples, and, besides, each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed to.
"Be slow, then, in your deliberations, for no slight matters are at stake; and do not, influenced by the opinions and accusations of others, burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your own. Realise before you get into it how great are the chances of miscalculation in war.
For when it is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve itself into a mere matter of chance; and over chance both sides equally have no control, and what the outcome will be is unknown and precarious.
Most men rush into war and proceed to blows first, although that ought to be the last resort, and then, when they are in distress, at length have recourse to words.
But since we ourselves are not as yet involved in any such error and see that you are not, we urge you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or transgress your oaths, but to let our differences be settled by arbitration according to the agreement. But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall endeavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, following that path in which you have led the way."
Thus the Athenians spoke. And when the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the allies against the Athenians, and what the latter said in reply, they caused all others to withdraw and deliberated by themselves on the situation before them.
And the opinions of the majority tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they must go to war without delay. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed to be both sagacious and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows:
" I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had experience in my day of many wars, and I see men among you who are as old as I am; no one of them, therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, as would be the case with most men, nor because he thinks it a good or a safe thing.
And you would find that this war about which you are now deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if one should reflect upon it soberly.
For in a contest with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring statesBy the Peloponnesians Thucydides means the Spartan alliance; the neighbouring states would then be the Peloponnesian states not in the alliance, e.g. Argos. our power is of the same type with theirsi.e., it is military rather than naval; similar, too, in the matter of wealth, equipment, absence of foreign resources, tributary allies, etc. and we can be upon them quickly at every point; but when opposed to men whose territory is far away, who besides are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a larger population than is to be found in anyother single district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous allies subject to tribute—against such men why should we lightly take up arms ? In what do we place our trust that we should attack them unprepared ? In our ships? But there we are inferior;
and if we train and make ourselves ready to encounter them, that will take time. In our wealth then ? But in that respect we are still more deficient, neither having money in the treasury of the state nor finding it easy to raise money from our private resources by taxation.The poverty of the Peloponnesians is referred to by Pericles in Thuc. 1.141.3. The statement is true especially of the Spartans, but also of all the rest except the Corinthians.
" Perhaps some of us are emboldened by our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables us freely to invade and lay waste their territory.
But there is other territory in plenty over which they hold sway, and they will import by sea whatever they need.
And if, on the other hand, we try to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are chiefly islanders.
What then will be the character of the war we shall be waging? Unless we can either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the revenues by which they support their navy, we shall get the worst of it.
And, if it comes to that, we can no longer even conclude an honourable peace, especially if it is believed that we rather than they began the quarrel.
For we assuredly must not be buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children, so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited as they are, will either make themselves vassals to their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at the war.
"Yet assuredly I do not advise you that you should blindly suffer them to injure our allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but rather that you should adopt the following course: Do not take up arms yet, but send envoys to them and make complaints, without indicating too clearly whether we shall go to war or put up with their conduct; also in the meantime, let us proceed with our own preparations, in the first place by winning allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other additional resources in ships or money (for those who, like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of Barbarians);
and let us at the same time be developing our resources at home. And if they give any heed to our envoys, there could be nothing better;
but if not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we shall at length be better equipped to go against them, if we decide to do so. Or perhaps when they see our preparations, and that our words correspond thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they will both have their land still unravaged and their deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs and as yet not ruined.