Book 1
And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself, who, when his fleet was overcome and that he had no more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his army.
"Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same the three things of most advantage, namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two-thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait whereby he clearly saved the whole business and whom, though a stranger, you yourselves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you.
And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods, and even in that estate not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them, and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner.
So that we may say that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited and to the end you might still keep them so, and when you were afraid not of our danger but your own. Whereas we, coming from a city no more being, and putting ourselves into danger for a city hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in part and ourselves.
But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to have our territories wasted, or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had succeeded as he would himself.
"Therefore, men of Lacedaemon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians, for our courage at that time and for our prudence and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo.
Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord.
So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is out of the nature of the thing itself, as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit.
For when we had the envy of many and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger. For the revolts from us would all have been made to you.
Now it is no fault for men in danger to order their affairs to the best.
"For you also, men of Lacedaemon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus and order them to your best advantage. And had you, when the time was, by staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously or to have fallen into danger.
So that, though overcome by three of the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed till having computed the commodity, you now fall to allegation of equity, a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve anything by strength ever so far preferred as to divert him from his profit.
Those men are worthy of commendation who following the natural inclination of man in desiring rule over others are juster than for their own power they need.
And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make appear our own moderation; and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt rather than commendation.
"For though in pleas of covenants with our confederates when, in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious.
None of them considering that others, who in other places have dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it.
For they that have the power to compel need not at all to go to law. And yet these men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not, either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in this kind also they themselves cannot deny but the weaker must give way to the stronger.
And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice than for violence. For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine, and the other, because from one stronger, but necessity.
Therefore, when they suffered worse things under the Medes' dominion, they bore it, but think ours to be rigorous. And good reason, for to men in subjection the present is ever the worst estate.
Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, you would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for fear of us if you should do again as you did for awhile when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions are different from those of others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he neither useth those of yours nor yet those of the rest of Greece.
Deliberate therefore of this a great while as of a matter of great importance, and do not upon the opinions and criminations of others procure your own trouble. Consider before you enter how unexpected the chances of war be.
For a long war for the most part endeth in calamity from which we are equally far off, and whether part it will light on is to be tried with uncertainty.
And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come behind; and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning.
But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths, but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us.
Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians and the Athenians' answer, they put them everyone out of the court and consulted of the business among themselves.
And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this, that the Athenians had done unjustly and ought speedily to be warred on. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.
"Men of Lacedaemon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me to have the like, insomuch as you cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do, nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe.
And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of will find it to be no small one.
For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states we have equal strength and can quickly be upon them, yet against men whose territory is remote and are also expert seamen and with all other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides, and that have many confederates paying them tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such haste to it? On our navy?
But therein we are too weak; and if we will provide and prepare against them, it will require time. On our money? But therein also we are more too weak; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute.
"But it may be some rely on this, that we exceed them in arms and multitude of soldiers so that we may waste their territories with incursions.
But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of.
Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping because the most of them are islanders.
What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping or take from them their revenue whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves.
And in this case to let fall the war again will be no honour for us when we are chiefly thought to have begun it.
As for the hope that if we waste their country, the war will soon be at an end, let that never lift us up; for I fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their earth, nor as men without experience to be astonished at the war.
"And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our confederates to be wronged and not apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them, but only not yet to take up arms but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance; and in the meantime to make our provision and make friends both of Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power either in shipping or money (nor are they to be blamed that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not Grecians only but also barbarians for their safety), and withal to set forth our own.
If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better appointed, we may war upon them if we will.
And when they see our preparation and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner, especially having their grounds unhurt and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet spoiled.
For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more by how much the better husbanded. The which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may, lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn.