Book 1
For we say that at Marathon we alone stood in the van of danger against the barbarian; and that when he came the second time, though we were not able to defend ourselves by land, we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis; which prevented his sailing against and ravaging the Peloponnese, city by city. while you would have been unable to assist one another against his numerous ships.
And he himself gave the greatest proof of this; for when conquered by sea, thinking that his power was no longer what it had been, retreated as quickly as he could with the greater part of his army.
"Such now having been the result, and it having been clearly shown that it was on the fleet of the Greeks that their cause depended, we contributed the three most useful things towards it; viz. the greatest number of ships, the most able man as a genera, and the most unshrinking zeal. Towards the four hundred ships we contributed not less than two parts; What parts we must suppose the speaker to have referred to in this passage, whether quarters or thirds, is much disputed. Didot and Göller maintain the former, as being in strict agreement with the statement of Herodotus, who makes the whole fleet to have consisted of three hundred and seventy-eight ships, and the Athenian portion of one hundred and eighty. Arnold, after Bredow and Poppo, supports the other interpretation, and observes, that this is not the statement of Thucydides, but of the Athenian orator, who is made very characteristically to indulge in gross exaggerations. See his whole note on the passage. Bishop Thirlwall, however, thinks that such an exaggeration would have been in very bad taste on such an occasion; and that Thucydides meant to state the true numbers; in which, he observes, if we read τριακοσίας for τετρακοσίας he would have followed aeschylus instead of Herodotus, whom indeed it is possible he had not read Vol 2. Append. 4. and Themistocles as commander, who was chiefly instrumental of their fighting in the Strait, which most clearly saved their cause; and you yourselves for this reason honoured him most, for a stranger, of all that have ever gone to you.
And a zeal by far the most daring we exhibited, inasmuch as when no one came to assist us by land, the rest as far as us being already enslaved, we determined, though we had left our city, and sacrificed our property, not even in those circumstances to abandon the common cause of the remaining allies, nor to become useless to them by dispersing; but to go on board our ships, and face the danger; and not to be angry because you had not previously assisted us.
So then we assert that we ourselves no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we obtained one. For you, setting out from cities that were inhabited, and with a view to enjoying them in future, came to our assistance, [only] after you were afraid for yourselves, and not so much for us; (at any rate, when we were still in safety, you did not come to us;) but we, setting out from a country which was no more, and running the risk for what existed only in scanty hope, bore our full share in the deliverance both of you and of ourselves.
But if we had before joined the Mede through fear for our country, like others, or had afterwards had no heart to go on board our ships, considering ourselves as ruined men; there would have been no longer any need of your fighting by sea without a sufficient number of ships, but things would have quietly progressed for him just as he wished.
"Do we not then deserve, Lacedaemonians, both for our zeal at that time, and the intelligence of our counsel, not to lie under such excessive odium with the Greeks, at least for the empire we possess?
For this very empire we gained, not by acting with violence, but through your having been unwilling to stand by them to finish the business with the barbarian, and through the allies having come to us, and of their own accord begged us to become their leaders:
and from this very fact we were compelled at first to advance it to its present height, principally from motives of fear, then of honour also, and afterwards of advantage too.
And it no longer appeared to be safe, when we were hated by the generality, and when some who had already revolted had been subdued, and you were no longer friends with us, as you had been, but suspicious of us, and at variance with us, to run the risk of giving it up; for those who revolted would have gone over to you. Literally, the revolts would have been to you.
And all may without odium secure their own interests with regard to the greatest perils. Or, none, are grudged securing, amp;c.
"You, at least, Lacedaemonians, have settled to your own advantage the government of the states in the Peloponnese over which you have a supremacy; and if at that time you had remained through the whole business, and been disliked in your command, as we were, we know full well that you would have become no less severe to the allies, and would have been compelled either to rule with a strong hand, or yourselves be exposed to danger.
So neither have we done any thing marvellous, or contrary to the disposition of man, in having accepted an empire that was offered to us, and not giving it up, influenced as we are by the strongest motives honour, and fear, and profit; and when, again, we had not been the first to set such a precedent, but it had always been a settled rule that the weaker should be constrained by the stronger; and when at the same time we thought ourselves worthy of it, and were thought so by you, until, from calculations of expediency, you now avail yourselves of the appeal to justice; which no one ever yet brought forward when lie had a chance of gaining any thing by might, and abstained from taking the advantage.
Nay, all are worthy of praise, who, after acting according to human nature in ruling others, have been more just than their actual power enabled them to be.
At any rate we imagine, that if some others had possessed our means, they would have best shown whether we are at all moderate or not; though to us there has unfairly resulted from our good nature disrepute rather than commendation.
"For from putting up with less than we might have had in contract-suits with the allies, and from having made our decisions in our own courts on the footing of equal laws, we are thought to be litigious.
And none of them considers why this reproach is not brought against those who have empire in any other quarter also, and are less moderate towards their subjects than we have been: for those who can act with violence have no need besides to act with justice.
But they, from being accustomed to have intercourse with us on a fair footing, if contrary to their notions of right they have been worsted in any thing, either by a legal judgment or by the power of our empire, even in any degree whatever; they feel no gratitude for not being deprived of the greater part [of their possessions], but are more indignant for what is lost than if from the first we had laid aside law, and openly taken advantage of them.
In that case not even they themselves would have denied that it was right for the weaker to yield to the stronger. But when injured it seems men are more angry than when treated with violence: for the one case is regarded as an advantage taken by their compulsion by their superior.
At least they endured much harder treatment than this at the hand of the Medes; whereas our rule is thought to be severe; and naturally so;
for their present condition is always irksome to subjects. You, at any rate, should you subdue us and possess an empire, would quickly lose the good-will which you have enjoyed through their fear of us; if you have the same views now as you gave symptoms of then, when you led then against the Mede for a short time. For you have institutions by yourselves, distinct from the rest of the world; and moreover, each individual of you, on going abroad., neither acts according to these, nor to those which the rest of Greece recognises.
Deliberate therefore slowly, as on no trifling matters; and do not, through being influenced by other people's views and accusations, bring on yourselves trouble of your own: but consider before on previously to your being engaged in it, how for when long protracted, it generally comes in the end to depend on chances;
from which we are equally removed, and run the risk in uncertainty as to which way it will turn out.
And in going to war men generally turn to deeds first, which they ought to do afterwards; and when they are in distress, then they have recourse to words.
We however, being neither ourselves yet involved in such an error, nor seeing you in it, charge you, while good counsel is still eligible to both sides, not to break treaty nor offend against your oaths, but to let our differences be judicially settled according to agreement. Else we will call to witness the gods who received cur oaths, and endeavour to requite you for commencing hostilities, in such a way as you may set the example.
Thus spoke the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard from the allies their charges against the Athenians, and from the Athenians what they had to say, they made them all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them.
And the opinions of the majority went the same way; viz. that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they ought to go to war with all speed. But Archidamus their king, a man who was considered both intelligent and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows.
"I have both myself already had experience in many wars, Lacedaemonians, and see that those of you who are of the same age [have had it also]; so that one would neither desire the business from inexperience, as might be the case with most men, nor from thinking it a good and safe one.
But this war, about which you are now consulting, you would find likely to be none of the least, if any one should soberly consider it.
For against the Peloponnesians and our neighbours our strength is of the same description, and we can quickly reach our destination in each case. But against men who live in a country far away, and besides are most skilful by sea, and most excellently provided with every thing else, with riches, both private and public, and ships, and horses, and heavy-armed, and a crowd of irregulars, such as there is not in any one Grecian town beside, and moreover, have many allies under payment of tribute; how can it be right to declare war rashly against these men? and in what do we trust, that we should hurry on to it unprepared? Is it in our ships? Nay, we are inferior to them:
but if we shall practise and prepare against them, time will pass in the interval. Well then, is it in our money? Nay, but we are still more deficient in this, and neither have it in the public treasury, nor readily contribute it from our private funds.
"Perhaps some one might feel confident because we excel them in heavy-armed troops, and in numbers, so that we might invade and ravage their land.
But they have other land in abundance, over which they rule, and will import what they want by sea.
If, again, we shall attempt to make their allies revolt from them, we shall have to assist these also with ships, as they are generally islanders.
What then will be the character of our war? For if we do not either conquer them by sea, or take away the revenues with which they maintain their fleet, we shall receive the greater damage;
and at such a time it will no longer even be honourable to make peace; especially if we are thought to have begun the quarrel more than they.
For let us now not be buoyed up with this hope, at any rate, that the war will soon be ended, if we ravage their land. Rather it even to our children: so probable is it that the Athenians would neither be enslaved Compare II. 61. 3. δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον. κ. τ. λ. in spirit to their land, nor, like inexperienced men, be panic-stricken by the war.
"I do not however, on the other hand, tell you to permit them, without noticing it, to harm our allies, and not to detect them in plotting against us; but I tell you not to take up arms at present, but to send and remonstrate; neither showing too violent signs of war, nor yet that we will put up with their conduct; and in the mean time to complete our own preparations also, both by bringing over allies whether Greeks or barbarians, from whatever source we shall receive additional strength, either in ships or in money; (for all who. like us are plotted against by the Athenians. may without (odium save themselves by accepting the aid not only of Greeks, but of barbarians also;) and at the same time let us bring out our own resources.
And if they listen at all to our ambassadors. that is the best conclusion; but if not. after an interval of two or three years, we shall then go against them, if we think tit, in a better state of defence.
And perhaps when they then saw our preparation, and our language speaking in accordance with it, they might be more disposed to yield, while they had their land as yet unravaged, and were deliberating about good things still enjoyed by them, and not yet sacrificed.