Book 1
After this, the Lacedaemonians waged what is called the sacred war, and having taken possession of the temple at Delphi, gave it up to the Delphians: and the Athenians again afterwards, on their retiring, marched and took possession of it, and restored it to the Phocians.
Some time having elapsed after these things, the Boeotian exiles being in possession of Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in Boeotia, the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, marched with one thousand heavy-armed of their own and the several contingents of the allies, against these places; for they were hostile to them.
Having taken Chaeronea, [and reduced it to slavery, Poppo and Göller omit these words; Bekker and Arnold put them in brackets. ] they were retiring, after placing a garrison in it. But as they were on their march, the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, and with them some Locrians and exiles of the Euboeans, and all that were of the same views, attacked them at Coronea, and, having defeated them in battle, slew some of the Athenians, and took others of them alive.
So the Athenians evacuated all Boeotia, having made peace on condition of recovering their men.
And the exiles of the Boeotians were restored, and they and all the rest became independent again.
Not long after this, Euboea revolted from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already crossed over to it with an army of Athenians, news was brought him that Megara had revolted; that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica; and that the Athenian garrison had been put to the sword by the Megareans, except as many as had escaped to Nisaea. Now the Megareans had revolted, after calling to their aid the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Epidaurians. So Pericles took the army back from Euboea as quickly as possible.
After this the Peloponnesians made an incursion as far as Eleusis and Thrium, and ravaged the country, under the command of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians; and without advancing any farther they returned home.
And the Athenians having again crossed over to Euboea under the command of Pericles, subdued the whole of it, and settled the rest of the island by treaty; but the Histiaeans they expelled from their homes, and held the territory themselves.
Having returned from Euboea, not long after they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, Achaia; for of these places in the Peloponnese the Athenians were in possession. Now in the sixth year a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene;
and the Milesians being worsted in the war went to the Athenians, and raised an outcry against the Samians; some private individuals from Samos itself taking part with them, from a wish to effect a revolution in the government.
The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships, and established a democracy; and taking as hostages from the Samians fifty boys and as many men, deposited them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island, withdrew.
But the exiles of the Samians (for there were some who did not remain in the island, but fled to the continent) having made arrangements with the most powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pisuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had the satrapy of Sardis at that time, and having collected auxiliaries to the number of seven hundred, crossed over to Samos towards night, and in the first place rose up against the commons, and secured most of them;
then, having secretly removed their hostages from Lemnos, they revolted, and gave up to Pisuthnes the garrison and its commanders that were with them, and immediately prepared to go against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them.
The Athenians, when they were aware of it, sailed with sixty ships for Samos, but did not use sixteen of them (for some were gone towards Caria to look out for the Phoenician fleet; others towards Chios and Lesbos, carrying about orders to bring reinforcements); with forty-four, however, under the command of Pericles and nine others, they fought a battle near the island of Tragia with seventy ships of the Samians, twenty of which were transports, (they all happened to be sailing from Miletus,) and the Athenians were victorious.
Afterwards there came to them a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens, and five and twenty from Chios and Lesbos; and when they had disembarked, and had the superiority in land forces, they invested the city with three walls, and blockaded it by sea at the same time.
Then Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading squadron, and went as quickly as possible in the direction of Caunus and Caria, news having been brought that the Phoenician fleet was sailing against them: for there had also gone from Samos Stesagoras and some others with five ships to fetch those of the Phoenicians.
At this time the Samians, having suddenly sallied out, fell on the unprotected camp, and destroyed the guard-ships, and in a sea-fight defeated those that put out against them, and were masters of the sea along their coasts about fourteen days, carrying in and out what they pleased.
But on the arrival of Pericles they were again closely blockaded by the fleet. Afterwards there came reinforcements, of forty ships with Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, from Athens, and of thirty from Chios and Lesbos.
Against these the Samians fought a short battle by sea, but being unable to hold out, were reduced in the ninth month, and surrendered on conditions; dismantling their wall, and giving hostages, and delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay back by instalments the expenses of the war. The Byzantines also agreed to be subject as before.
After these things, though not many years later, what we have before narrated now took place, namely, the affair of Corcyra, and that of Potidaea, and whatever was made a pretext for this war.
All these things that the Greeks performed against one another and the barbarian, occurred in about fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war: in the course of which the Athenians established their empire on a firmer footing, and themselves advanced to a great pitch of power; while the Lacedaemonians, though they perceived it, did not try to stop them, except for a short time, but remained quiet the greater part of the period. For even before this they were not quick in proceeding to hostilities, unless they were compelled; and to a certain extent also they were hindered by intestine wars; He seems to refer especially to the revolt of the Helots. until the power of the Athenians was clearly rising to a dangerous height, and they were encroaching on their confederacy. Then, however, they considered it no longer endurable, but were of opinion that they ought with the greatest resolution to attack their power, and overthrow it, if they could, by commencing this war. Now the Lacedaemonians themselves had decided that the treaty had been broken, and that the Athenians were guilty;
but they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god, whether it would be better for them if they went to war : and he answered them, as it is reported, that if they carried on the war with all their might, they would gain the victory; and said that he would himself take part with them, whether called upon or not.
Still they wished to summon the allies again, and put it to the vote, whether they should go to war. When the ambassadors had come from the confederates, and an assembly had been held, the others said what they wished, most of them accusing the Athenians, and demanding that war should be declared; and the Corinthians, who had even before begged them each separately, state by state, to vote for the war—being afraid for Potidaea, lest it should be destroyed first—and who were present then also, came forward last, and spoke as follows:
"We can no longer, allies, find fault with the Lacedaemonians, as not having both themselves voted for war, and now brought us together for this purpose: The γὰρ in the succeeding words, χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, refers to a suppressed sentence: "We cannot now blame them; but had they acted differently, we should have had a right to blame them; for those who command others should provide for the welfare of others:—Arnold. [though we should have blamed them if they had not done so]. For it is the duty of leaders, while they conduct their private affairs on a footing of equality, to provide for the interests of all; as they are also in other respects honoured above all.
Now as many of us as have already had any dealings with the Athenians require no warning to beware of them; but those who live more in the interior, and not in the high way of communication, ought to know, that if they do not defend those on the coast, they will find the carrying down of their produce [for exportation] more difficult, and the procuring again of those things which the sea affords to the mainland; and they ought not to be indifferent judges of what is now said, as though it did not affect them, but to consider that some time or other, if they should sacrifice the towns on the coast, the danger would reach even to them; and that they are now consulting for themselves no less [than for others].
And for this reason they ought not to shrink from passing to war instead of pence For it is the part of prudent men, indeed, to remain quiet, should they not be injured; but of brave men, when injured, to go from peace to war; and when a good opportunity offers, to come to an understanding again from hostilities; and neither to be elated by their success in war, nor to brook injury through being charmed with the quiet of peace.
For he who shrinks from this course for love of pleasure, would most quickly be deprived of the delights of indolence, for which he shrinks from it, should he remain quiet; and he who in war becomes grasping through success, does not reflect that he is buoyed up by a confidence that cannot be trusted.
For many measures, though badly planned, have yet succeeded, through See note on I. 32. 3. the adversary being still worse advised; and still more have there been which, though seeming to be well arranged, have on the contrary come to a disgraceful issue. For no one I have followed Göller's reading of ὁμοία; Arnold prefers ὁμοῖα considering it as dependent on the two verbs ἐνθυμεῖται and ἐπεξέρχεται. What we speculate on in our expectations, and what we accomplish in our practice, are wholly different from each other. My chief reason for preferring the former interpretation is, that the article is only used with πίστει, and not with both nouns, as I think it usually is in other passages, where there is so marked an opposition between them: e. g. I. 71. 1. οἵι ἄν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πράσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ κ. τ. λ. II. 11. 6. τῇ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμία, τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλέους στρατεύειν, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρασκευάζεσθαι. Unless it is omitted in both cases, as I. 85. 5. τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ επεξιέναι. For other instances of ὁμοῖος with the force here given to it, see note on ch. 30. 5. conceives his plans with [only] the same degree of confidence as he carries them out in action; but we form our opinions in security, [and therefore with assurance;] whereas we fail in action through fear.
"Now as for ourselves, we are at the present time preparing for war because we are injured, and have sufficient grounds of complaint;
and when we have avenged ourselves on the Athenians, we will lay it down again in good time. And for many reasons it is likely that we should have the advantage; first, as we are superior in numbers and military experience;
and secondly, as we all proceed with equal obedience to do what we are ordered. And for a fleet, in which they are so strong, we will equip one from the property we severally possess, and from the money at Delphi and Olympia; for by contracting a loan of that we shall be able, by means of higher pay, to rob them of their foreign sailors. For the power of the Athenians is mercenary, rather than native: but ours would be less exposed to this, as it is strong in men more than in money.
And by one victory [gained by us] in a sea-fight, in all probability they are ruined; but should they hold out, we too shall have more time for studying naval matters; and when we have put our skill on an equal footing with theirs, in courage we shall most certainly excel them. For the advantage which we possess by nature cannot be acquired by them through learning;
whereas the superiority which they have in point of skill may be attained by us through practice. And to have money for this purpose, we will raise contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should not refuse to contribute it for their own slavery, while we would not spend it to be avenged on our enemies, and to save ourselves at the same time, and to avoid suffering by means of this very money, i.e. as it would be made the instrument of Athenian tyranny, if by submission they allowed them to take it from them. Or, on this very point of money, as Arnold renders it. through having it taken from us by them.
"We have also other ways of carrying on war, such as causing their allies to revolt, (which is the most effectual mode of taking from them the revenues in which they are so strong,) and See ch. 142. 3, where Pericles mentions the two different methods of ἐπιτείχισις, the one, as Arnold explains it, by founding a city in the neighbourhood of Athens, strong enough to interfere with her trade, and be a check upon her power, πόλιν ἀντίπαλον; the other by merely raising one or two forts in Attica, as strong-holds for plundering parties to keep the country in constant annoyance and alarm. raising works to annoy their country; with other things which one could not now foresee. For war least of all things proceeds on definite principles, but adopts most of its contrivances from itself to suit the occasion: in the course of which he that deals with it with good temper is more secure; while he that engages in it with passion makes the greater failure.
Let us reflect also, that if we were severally engaged in [only] quarrels with our equals about boundaries of territory, it might be borne : but as it is, the Athenians are a match for us all together, and still more powerful against single states; so that unless all in a body, and nation by nation, and city by city, with one mind we defend ourselves against them, they will certainly subdue us without trouble, when divided. And as for defeat, though it may be a terrible thing for any one to hear of, let him know that it brings nothing else but downright slavery:
which is disgraceful for the Peloponnese to be even mentioned as contingent, and for so many cities to be ill-treated by one. In that case we should appear either to be justly treated, or to put up with it through cowardice, and to show ourselves inferior to our fathers, who liberated Greece; whereas we do not even secure this liberty for ourselves, but allow a tyrant state to set itself up amongst us, though we think it right to put down monarchs in any one state.
And we do not know how this conduct is cleared of three of the greatest evils, folly, or cowardice, or carelessness. For you certainly have not escaped Or, for surely you have not, through a wish to escape these imputations, betaken yourselves, etc. The play on the words καταφρόνησις and ἀφροσύνη, says Arnold, can hardly be preserved in English: 'A sense of your adversaries' inferiority is so fatal a feeling to those who entertain it, that it more fitly deserves to be called nonsense.' these by betaking yourselves to that contempt of your foes, which has injured far more than any thing else; and which, from ruining so many, has been called by the opposite name of senselessness.
"With regard then to what has been done before, why need we find fault with it at greater length than is expedient for what is doing now? But with respect to what will be hereafter, we must labour for it by supporting what is present; for it is our hereditary custom to acquire virtues by labours; and you must not change the fashion, if you have a slight superiority now in wealth and power; (for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in abundance;) but must go to the war with good courage on many grounds; since the god has commanded it, and promised to take part with you himself; while the rest of Greece will all join you in the struggle, some for fear, and some for interest. Nor will you be the first to break the treaty;
for even the god himself considers it to have been violated, since he orders you to go to war; but you will rather come to its support after it has been wronged: for the breakers of it are, not those who defend themselves, but those who were the first aggressors.
So then, since on every ground you have good reason for going to war, and since we all in common recommend this, inasmuch as it is most certain that this is expedient both for states and individuals [in our league]; do not defer to assist the Potidaeans, who are Dorians, and are besieged by Ionians, (the contrary of which used formerly to be the case,) and to vindicate the liberty of the rest; since it is no longer possible for them to wait, The participle περιμένοντας refers to the whole body of the confederate, which is afterwards represented in two divisions by the use of the article with μέν and δέ while some are already injured, and others will be treated in the same way not much later, if we shall be known to have come together, but not to dare to avenge ourselves: