Book 5
While Antony was thus occupied the treaty existing beween Octavius and Pompeius was broken for other reasons, as was suspected, than those avowed by Octavius, which were the following: Antony had ceded Peloponnesus to Pompeius on condition that the tribute then due from the Peloponnesians should either be given over at once, or that it should be guaranteed by Pompeius to Antony, or that the former should wait till the collection had been made. Pompeius had not accepted it on these conditions. He thought that it had been given to him with the amount of tribute then due. Vexed, as Octavius said, whether at this state of things, or from his general faithlessness, or his jealousy because the others had large armies, or because Menodorus had prompted him to consider the agreement as a truce rather than a lasting peace, he began to build ships, and recruit crews, and once harangued his soldiers, telling them they must be prepared for everything. Private robbery again infested the sea, and there was little or no relief from the famine among the Romans, who cried out that the treaty had brought no deliverance from their sufferings, but only a fourth partner to the tyranny. Octavius having caught certain pirates and put them to torture, they said that Pompeius had sent them out, and Octavius proclaimed this to the people and wrote it to Pompeius himself, who disavowed it and made a counter complaint respecting the Peloponnesus.
Those of the nobility who were still with Pompeius, seeing him always under the influence of his freedmen, bribed some of them, either for their own purposes or to gratify Octavius, to incite their master against Menodorus, who was still governing Corsica and Sardinia.ἐξοτρύνειν ἐπὶ Μηνοδώρῳ Κύρνου καὶ Σαρδοῦς ἔτι ἄρχοντι, τὸν δεσπότην. All the codices except one omit the words Κύρνου καὶ Σαρδοῦς, leaving the passage hopeless. Mendelssohn was so fortunate as to find the true reading in the Vatican MS. The freedmen did this gladly, because they were envious of the power of Menodorus. In this way Pompeius was brought to an estrangement with Menodorus. About the same time Philadelphus, a freedman of Octavius, made a voyage to Menodorus to procure corn, and Micylio, the closest friend of Menodorus, visited Octavius to arrange for the desertion of Menodorus. The latter promised to hand over to him Sardinia, Corsica, three legions of soldiers, and a large number of light-armed troops. Whether this was the work of Philadelphus, or was a consequence of the calumnies against Menodorus, which Pompeius had listened to, Octavius accepted the offer, not immediately, but soon, since he considered the peace broken in fact. He invited Antony to come from Athens and meet him at Brundusium on an appointed day, in order to take counsel with him about the war. At the same time he brought war-ships from Ravenna and an army from Gaul, and the remainder of his apparatus, rapidly to Brundusium and Puteoli, intending to sail from both sides of Italy to Sicily if Antony should agree in opinion with him.
Antony came at the appointed day with a small escort, but not finding Octavius there he did not wait, either because he did not approve of the war, considering it a violation of the treaty, or because he observed Octavius’ great preparations (for the desire to be the sole ruler did not permit their fears to slumber at any time), or because he was alarmed by a prodigy. It was found that one of the guards who slept around his tent had been devoured by wild beasts except his face only, as though this had been left for the purpose of recognition, and that he had uttered no cry, nor did any of those who were asleep with him know of it. The Brundusians said that a wolf had been seen just before daybreak running away from the tents. Nevertheless Antony wrote to Octavius not to violate the treaty, and he threatened Menodorus with punishment as his own fugitive slave; for the latter had been the slave of Pompey the Great, whose property Antony had bought when it was sold under the law of war.
Octavius sent officers to receive Sardinia and Corsica, which Menodorus turned over to them. He strengthened the Italian coast with numerous towers to prevent Pompeius from raiding it again. He ordered the building of new triremes at Rome and Ravenna, and he sent for a large army from Illyria. When Menodorus came he made the latter a free citizen instead of a freedman, and put him in command, under the admiral Calvisius, of the ships which he had brought with him. When he had finished these preparations and brought together a still larger amount of war material he yet delayed, and he reproached Antony for not waiting. He ordered Cornificius to bring with him to Tarentum everything that was now in readiness. While Cornificius was making the voyage a storm overtook him which destroyed only the admiral’s ship, which had been built for Octavius himself. This was considered an omen of what was to take place. As the belief still prevailed that this war was a violation of the treaty, Octavius sought to dispel the suspicion. He wrote to the city and he told his soldiers that Pompeius had violated the treaty by encouraging piracy, that the pirates had confessed this, that Menodorus had revealed the whole design, and that Antony knew it, and for that reason had refused to give up the Peloponnesus.
When all things were in readiness he set sail for Sicily, going himself from Tarentum, while Calvisius, with Sabinus and Menodorus, sailed from Etruria. The infantry was sent on the march to Rhegium and great haste was displayed in all quarters. Pompeius had scarcely heard of the desertion of Menodorus when Octavius was already moving against him. While the hostile fleets were advancing from both sides, he awaited the attack of Octavius at Messana, and ordered his freedman Menecrates, who was the bitterest enemy of Menodorus, to advance against Calvisius and Menodorus with a large fleet. Menecrates was observed by his enemies near nightfall on the open sea. They retired into the bay near Cumae, where they passed the night, Menecrates proceeding to Aenaria. At daybreak they drew up their fleet, in the form of a crescent, as close to the shore as possible, in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through it. Menecrates again showed himself, and immediately came on with a rush. As his enemies would not advance to the open sea, and he could do nothing of importance there, he made a charge in order to drive them upon the land. They beached their ships and fought back against the attacking prows. Menecrates had the opportunity to draw off and renew the attack as he pleased, and to bring up fresh ships by turns, while the enemy were distressed by the rocks, on which they had grounded, and by the inability to move. They were like infantry contending against sea forces, unable either to pursue or retreat.
In this situation Menodorus and Menecrates came in sight of each other; and, abandoning the rest of the fight, drove against each other with fury and shouting, as though they had staked the issue of the battle on this encounter, whichever should be the victor. Their ships came into violent collision and were badly damaged, Menodorus losing his prow and Menecrates his oar-blades. Grapplingirons were thrown by both, and the ships, being fastened together, could no longer manœuvre, but the men, as in a battle on land, failed not in deeds of valor. Showers of javelins, stones, and arrows were discharged, and bridges for boarding were thrown from one ship to the other. As the ship of Menodorus was higher than the other his bridges made a better passageway for his daring crew, and his missiles were more effective for the same reason. Many men were already slain, and the remainder wounded, when Menodorus was pierced in the arm with a dart, which was, however, drawn out. Menecrates was struck in the thigh with a Spanish javelin, made wholly of iron with numerous barbs, which could not be readily extracted. Although Menecrates could no longer take part in the fight, he remained there all the same, encouraging the others, until his ship was captured, when he plunged into the depths of the sea. Menodorus towed the captured ship to the land, but was able to do nothing more himself.
This took place on the left wing of the naval fight. Calvisius directed his course from the right to the left and cut off some of Menecrates’ ships from the main body, and when they fled pursued them to the open sea. Demochares, who was a fellow-freedman of Menecrates and his lieutenant, fell upon the remainder of Calvisius’ ships, put some of them to flight, broke others in pieces on the rocks, and set fire to them after the crews had abandoned them. Finally Calvisius, returning from the pursuit, led back his own fleeing ships and prevented the burning of any more. As night was approaching, all returned to their former station. Such was the end of this naval fight, in which the forces of Pompeius had much the best of it; but Demochares, grieving over the death of Menecrates as the greatest possible defeat (for those two, Menecrates and Menodorus, had been the foremost of Pompeius’ sea captains), abandoned everythingἅπαντα μεθεὶς ἐκ χειρῶν: abandoned everything. All the codices read ἐκ κέρων (from the wings), which, being nonsense, led to much conjecture in the learned world. Schweighäuser solved the difficulty by striking them out, and marking a lacuna at that place. Tyrwhitt furnishes a happy solution (see preface to the Didot edition) by substituting χειρῶν for κέρων,, so that the phrase is equivalent to released his hold in English. and sailed for Sicily immediately, mediately, as though he had lost not merely the body of Menecrates and one ship, but his whole, fleet.
Calvisius, as long as he expected that Demochares would renew his attack, remained at his station, unable to fight in the open sea, for his best ships had been destroyed and the others were unfit for battle. When he learned that his antagonist had gone to Sicily, he repaired his ships and coasted along the shore exploring the bays. Octavius, in the meantime, proceeded from Tarentum to Rhegium, with a large fleet and army, and near Messana came up with Pompeius, who had forty ships only. Octavius’ friends advised him to improve this most favorable opportunity and attack Pompeius with his great fleet, while the latter had so few ships and before the rest of his naval force should arrive. He did not follow this advice, but waited for Calvisius, saying that it was not good policy to run a risk when he was expecting reinforcements. When Demochares arrived at Messana, Pompeius appointed him and Apollophanes, another of his freedmen, admirals in place of Menodorus and Menecrates.
When Octavius heard of his disaster at Cumae he sailed out of the straits to meet Calvisius. After accomplishing the greater part of the distance and while he was passing StylisSchweighäuser gives this place the Latin name of Columna Rhegina, which is referred to by Strabo (III. v. 5) as a small tower erected by the inhabitants of Rhegium at the strait of Sicily, and turning into Scyllaeum, Pompeius darted out of Messana and fell upon his rear, pushed on to his front, attacked him all along the line, and challenged him to fight. Although beset in this way, Octavius’ fleet did not give battle, since Octavius did not permit it, either because he feared to fight in the straits or because he adhered to his first determination not to fight without Calvisius. He gave orders, however, that all should hug the shore, cast anchor, and defend themselves with their prows toward the enemy. Demochares,by setting two of his ships by turns against one of the enemy’s, threw them into confusion. They dashed against the rocks and against each other, and began to fill with water. And so these ships were lost, like those at Cumae, without striking a blow, being stuck fast and battered by the enemy, who had freedom of movement to advance and retreat.One of the mishaps to which ancient manuscripts were exposed is found here. Several codices add to this sentence the words ἐμελλ’, ἐπεὶ οὐδέπω κακόν γ’ ἀπώλετο, very likely, since nothing that is bad ever perishes. Musgrave stamped it as erroneous. Schweighäuser recognized it as an iambic verse from some poet whom he could not recall, and inferred that somebody had written it on the margin of his copy, and that the next copyist had embodied it in the text. So he rejected it. Nauck points out the original in the Philoctetes of Sophocles (446). It is found in the editio princeps of Appian and in the Latin versions of both Candidus and Geslen, whose attempts to reconcile it with the text are ingenious but futile.
Octavius leaped from his ship upon the rocks and pulled out of the water those who swam ashore, and conducted them to the mountain above. However, Cornificius and the other generals who were there, encouraged each other, cut loose from their anchors without awaiting orders, and put to sea against the enemy, thinking that it was better to be conquered fighting than to fall unresisting before the blows of their assailants. First, with wonderful audacity, Cornificius rammed the flag-ship of Demochares and captured it. The latter leaped upon another vessel. Then, while the struggle and carnage were in progress, Calvisius and Menodorus hove in sight, advancing from the open sea, although they had not been observed by Octavius’ men either from the land or the water. The Pompeians, being farther out at sea, beheld them first, and, when they saw them, retreated, for darkness was approaching, and, fatigued as they were, they dared not encounter fresh men. This conjuncture happened very opportunely for those who had just now been in difficulties.
At nightfall, those who had reached the shore from the ships took refuge on the mountains and lighted numerous fires as signals to those who were still on the sea, and there passed the night without food, uncared for, and in want of everything. Octavius fared like the rest, and moved around exhorting them to endure their privations till morning. While he was undergoing these hardships it was not known that Calvisius had arrived, nor could anything thing needful be obtained from the ships in their wrecked condition. But good luck came to them from another quarter. The thirteenth legion was approaching by way of the mountains, and, learning of the disaster and judging of the road by the fire, they made their way through the crags. They found their commander, and those who had taken refuge with him, suffering from fatigue and want of food, and ministered to them, dividing the work, some caring for some, others for others. The centurions brought their commander into an improvised tent, as none of his body-servants were present, these having been dispersed in the darkness and disorder. He sent messengers in all directions forthwith, to announce that he was safe, and he learned that Calvisius had arrived with the vanguard of his fleet; and, in view of these two helpful and unexpected events, he allowed himself some rest.
The next morning, when Octavius looked out upon the water, he beheld some of his ships burned, others partly burned, others still burning, and others broken in pieces; and the sea filled with sails, rudders, and furniture, while, of the ships that were saved, the greater part were damaged. Having ranged the fleet of Calvisius in front, he made repairs on those of his vessels that most needed them, turning them on their sides,ἐπεσκεύαζε τὰ ἐπείγοντα τῶν σκαφῶν πλαγιάσας. Schweighäuser’s Latin version renders this: He repaired those which especially required attention, sailing in the meantime near the shore on an oblique course. Yet in a note on this passage he inclines to the opinion that πλαγιάσας means, not sailing obliquely, but turning the ships on their sides — a more rational method of making repairs. The Didot edition adheres to the former rendering. the enemy meantime remaining quiet, either because they feared Calvisius, or because they had decided to attack again in the open sea. Thus they remained on either side until midday, when a south wind burst upon them, raising violent billows in that surging and confined channel. Pompeius was then inside the harbor of Messana. The ships of Octavius were again shattered on the rough and inhospitable coast, dashing against the rocks and against each other, for, as they were not fully manned, they were not under good control.
Menodorus, apprehending that this rising storm would increase in violence, moved farther seaward and rode at anchor where, on account of the depth of water, the waves were less boisterous; and even here he had recourse to hard rowing to avoid being driven ashore. Some of the others followed his example, but most of them, thinking that the wind would soon subside, as it usually did in the springtime, moored themselves with anchors on either side, landward and seaward, and thrust out poles to prevent collisions with each other. As the wind grew more violent everything was thrown into confusion. The ships collided, broke their anchors, and were upset on the shore one after another. Cries of alarm and groans of pain were mingled together, and exhortations that fell upon deaf ears. Orders could not be heard. There was no distinction between pilot and common sailor. Knowledge and authority were alike unavailing. The same destruction awaited those in the ships and those who fell overboard, the latter being crushed by wind, waves, and floating timber. The sea was full of sails, spars, and men, living and dead. Those who sought to escape by swimming to land were dashed against the rocks by the surf. When the convulsion seized the water,Ὡς δὲ καὶ τὸ σπάσμα τῆν θάλασσαν ἐλάμβανεν. This refers to the whirlpool at Charybdis. as is usual in that strait, they were terrified, being unaccustomed to it, and then their vessels were whirled around and dashed against each other worse than ever. As night came on the wind increased in fury, so that they perished no longer in the light but in the darkness.
Groans were heard throughout the entire night, and the cries of men running along the shore and calling their friends and relatives upon the sea by name, and mourning for them as lost when they could hear no responses; and anon the cries of others lifting their heads above the waves and beseeching aid from those on shore. Nothing could be done on either land or water. Not only was the sea inexorable to those engulfed in it, as well as to those still in the ships, but the danger from the storm was almost as great on land, lest the surf should dash them against the rocks. So distressed were they by this unexampled tempest that those who were nearest the land feared the land, yet could not get sufficient offing to avoid collision with each other, for the narrowness of the place and its naturally difficult outlet, together with the force of the waves, the rotary motion of the wind, caused by the surrounding mountains, and the whirlpool of the deep, holding everything in its grasp, allowed neither tarrying nor escape. The darkness of a very black night added to their distress. And so they perished, no longer even seeing each other, some uttering confused cries, others yielding in silence, accepting their doom, some even hastening it, believing that they were utterly lost. The disaster so far surpassed their experience that it bereft them of the hope of saving themselves even by chance. Finally, at the approach of daylight, the wind suddenly relaxed its force, and after sunrise wholly died away; yet even then, although the storm had ceased, the surges rolled a long time. The fury of the tempest surpassed the memory of the oldest inhabitants. It was altogether unexampled, and the greater part of Octavius’ ships and men were destroyed by it.
Octavius, who had lost heavily in the battle the previous day and had sustained two severe calamities together, took the road in haste to Vibo that same night, by way of the mountains, being unable to repair this disaster, for which there was no help at hand. He wrote to all his friends and generals to be on the alert lest a plot should be formed against him here or there, as is liable to be the case when adversity comes. He despatched the infantry he had with him to all points on the Italian coast, lest Pompeius should be emboldened by his good luck even to invade the mainland. But the latter had no thought of an expedition by land. He did not even attack the ships that were left from the wreck, nor those that went away after the storm had subsided. On the contrary, he paid no attention to the enemy while they were tying their ships together with ropes as well as they could, and sailing with a favorable wind to Vibo. He neglected them either because he thought that the disaster was all-sufficient for him, or because he did not know how to follow up a victory, or, as I have said elsewhere, because he was altogether inefficient in attack and cared only to defend himself against assailants.
Less than half of Octavius’ ships were saved, and these badly damaged. He left certain officers in charge of them and proceeded to Campania much cast down, for he had no other ships and he needed many; nor did he have time to build them, pressed as he was by the famine and by the people, who were again harassing him about a new treaty and mocking at the war as being in violation of the old one. He needed money, but had none. The Romans were not paying the taxes, nor would they allow the use of the revenues that he had devised. But he was always clever at discovering what was for his advantage. He sent Y.R. 717 Maecenas to Antony to change the mind of the latter respecting B.C. 37 the things about which they had lately had some bickering, and to bring him to an alliance. If Maecenas should not succeed, he intended to embark his infantry on merchant vesels, cross over to Sicily, abandon the sea, and wage war on land. While in this state of dejection the news reached him that Antony had agreed to the alliance, and he heard of a splendid victory over the Gauls of Aquitania, gained under the leadership of Agrippa. His friends and certain cities also promised him ships, and built them. Accordingly, Octavius cast off his despondency, and made more formidable preparations than his previous ones. Y.R. 718
At the beginning of spring, Antony set sail from Athens to Tarentum with 300 ships to assist Octavius as he had promised. But the latter had changed his mind and postponed his movement until his own ships should be finished. When called upon again and told that Antony’s forces were ready and sufficient, he advanced other reasons for delay. It was evident that he was again offended with Antony about something, or that he disdained his assistance because his own resources were abundant. Antony was vexed, but he remained, nevertheless, and communicated Y.R. 716 with Octavius again, because the expense of his fleet was B.C. 36 burdensome. Moreover, he needed Italian soldiers for his war against the Parthians, and he contemplated exchanging his fleet for a part of Octavius’ army; for, although it was provided in their treaty that each of them might recruit soldiers in Italy, it would be difficult for him to do so when Italy had fallen to the lot of Octavius. Accordingly, Octavia betook herself to her brother to act as mediator between them. Octavius complained that he had been abandoned by Antony when he was overtaken by danger in the straits. She replied that that had been explained through Maecenas. Octavius said that Antony had sent his freedman Callias to Lepidus in Africa to induce the latter to make an alliance against him. She replied that she knew that Callias had been sent to make arrangements about a marriage, because Antony desired, before setting out on his Parthian expedition, to marry his daughter to the son of Lepidus, as had been agreed. After Octavia had made this statement Antony sent Callias to Octavius with permission to put him to torture [in order to learn the truth]. Octavius would not receive him, but said that he would go and have an interview with Antony between Metapontum and Tarentum, at a place where there is a river of the latter name between them.The river Taras.
They both chanced to reach the river at the same time. Antony sprang down from his chariot and leaped alone into one of the skiffs moored near by, and rowed toward Octavius, showing confidence in him as a friend. When Octavius saw this he followed the example. So they met in the stream and contended with each other which of them should disembark on the other’s bank. Octavius prevailed because he was going to make a visit to Octavia at Tarentum. He took a seat with Antony in the latter’s chariot, and proceeded to his lodgings at Tarentum unprotected, and passed the night there without guards. On the following day Antony made the same exhibition of trust. Thus they were continually changing from suspicion born of rivalry to confidence due to their mutual needs.
However, Octavius postponed his expedition against Y.R. 718 Pompeius till the following year. On account of the Parthian war Antony was not able to wait. Nevertheless, they made an exchange with each other, Antony giving to Octavius 120 ships, which he sent at once and delivered at Tarentum, in return for which Octavius promised to send him 20,000 Italian legionaries. Octavia, begging the favor from Antony, made her brother a present of ten three-banked phaseli — a combination of war-ship and merchant vessel — and Octavius gave her in return 1000 picked men as a body-guard, to be selected by Antony. As the term of the triumvirate voted to them was about expiring, they renewed it for five years without again asking the people. And so they separated, Antony proceeding straightway to Syria and leaving Octavia with her brother, and also a daughter already born to them.
But Menodorus, — either because he was an habitual traitor, or because he feared the former threat of Antony, who had said that he would punish him as a rebellious slave, or because he had received less consideration than he had expected, or because the other freedmen of Pompeius were continually reproaching him for unfaithfulness to his master and urging him to return, — now that Menecrates was dead, asked forgiveness, and, having obtained it, deserted to Pompeius with seven ships, without the knowledge of Octavius’ admiral, Calvisius. For this reason Octavius dismissed the latter from his command and appointed Agrippa in his place. When the fleet was ready, Octavius performed a lustration for it in the following manner. Altars were erected on the margin of the sea, and the multitude were ranged around them in ships, observing the most profound silence. The priests who performed the ceremony offered the sacrifice while standing at the water’s edge, and carried the expiatory offerings in skiffs three times around the fleet, the general sailing with them, beseeching the gods to turn the bad omens against the victims instead of the fleet. Then, dividing the entrails, they cast a part of them into the sea, and put the remainder on the altars and burned them, while the multitude chanted in unison. In this way the Romans perform lustrations of the fleet.
It was intended that Octavius should set sail from Puteoli, Lepidus from Africa, and Taurus from Tarentum, to Sicily, in order to surround the enemy at once, from the east, the west, and the south. The day of Octavius’ sailing had been previously communicated to all. It was the tenth day after the summer solstice. This, in the Roman calendar, was the calends of the month which, in honor of the first Caesar, they call July instead of Quintilis. Octavius fixed on this day, perhaps because he considered it propitious on account of his father, who was always victorious. Pompeius stationed Plennius at Lilybaeum with one legion and a considerable body of light-armed troops, to oppose Lepidus. He guarded the whole coast of Sicily, both east and west, and especially the islands of Lipara and Cossyra, lest they should become convenient harbors and naval stations for Octavius and Lepidus against Sicily. The best part of his naval force he kept together at Messana watching its chances. In this way they made their preparations on either side.
When the calends came they all set sail at daybreak, Lepidus from Africa with 1000 ships of burden, seventy war vessels, twelve legions of soldiers, 500 Numidian horse, and a great quantity of apparatus; Taurus from Tarentum with only 102 of the 130 ships that Antony had left, since the oarsmen of the remainder had perished during the winter. Octavius sailed from Puteoli, offering sacrifices and pouring out libations from the admiral’s ship into the water to the propitious winds, and to Neptune, the guardian, and to the tranquil sea, that they should be his assistants against his father’s enemies. Certain ships sent in advance made examination of the bays, and Appius with a large squadron followed as a rear guard. On the third day after their departure a south wind blew with violence and capsized a large number of ships of burden belonging to Lepidus. Nevertheless, he reached the Sicilian coast, laid siege to Plennius in Lilybaeum, and got possession of some towns by persuasion and others by force. When the wind began to blow Taurus returned to Tarentum. While Appius was doubling the promontory of Minerva, some of his ships were shattered against the rocks, others ran with violence on the shoals, and the rest were dispersed, not without injury. At the beginning of the storm, Octavius took refuge in the sheltered bay of Elea, except one six-banked ship, which was wrecked on the promontory. The south wind was succeeded by a southwester, which threw the bay into commotion, as it opened toward the west. It was impossible to sail out of the bay with the wind still ahead, nor could the ships be held by oars or anchors. They crashed against each other or against the rocks, and the confusion became worse confounded by night.
When the tempest had subsided, Octavius buried the dead, cared for the wounded, clothed those who had swum ashore and furnished them with new weapons, and repaired his whole fleet with the means at his command. Six of his heavy ships, twenty-six lighter ones, and a still larger number of liburnicas had been destroyed. He was likely to consume nearly thirty days in these repairs; and now the end of summer was approaching, for which reason he deemed it best to postpone the war till the following summer, but as the people were suffering from scarcity he drew his ships upon the land and made his preparations rapidly, and sent the crews of the ships that he had lost to fill the empty ones in the fleet of Taurus. In anticipation of more serious misfortune he sent Maecenas to Rome on account of those who were still under the spell of the memory of Pompey the Great, for the fame of that man had not yet lost its influence over them. Octavius himself visited the new colonies throughout Italy and dispelled their fears, which had been excited by the recent events. He also went to Tarentum and inspected the naval force under Taurus. Thence he proceeded to Vibo, where he encouraged his infantry and hastened the preparations of his fleet, the time for his second invasion of Sicily being near at hand.
Pompeius did not deign to seize the fine opportunity presented to him by so many shipwrecks. He merely offered sacrifice to the sea and to Neptune, assuming to call himself their son, and persuading himself that it was not without the special act of Providence that his enemies had been twice overwhelmed in this way in the summer months. It is said that he was so much puffed up by these circumstances that he exchanged the purple cloak customary to Roman commanders for a dark blue one, to signify that he was the adopted son of Neptune. He hoped that Octavius would now desist from his undertaking, but when he learned that the latter was building ships and was about to renew the expedition against him that summer, he became alarmed at finding himself at war with a man of such indomitable spirit and such formidable preparations. He sent Menodorus, with the seven ships he had brought, to reconnoitre the dockyards of Octavius and to do whatever damage he could. Menodorus had been vexed for some time past because the naval command had not been given to him, and he now perceived that he was intrusted with only the ships that he had brought, because he was under suspicion. So he plotted a new desertion.
Conceiving that, however matters might turn out, he should first signalize himself by some act of valor, he distributed among his companions all the gold he had, and sailed, by rowing three days, accomplishing a distance of 1500 stades, and fell like a thunderbolt, unperceived, on the vessels that were guarding Octavius’ shipyards, and darted away to an unseen place carrying off the guard-ships by twos and threes. He also sunk, or captured, or burned some merchant vessels, laden with corn, that were moored there or sailing along the coast. Everything was thrown into confusion by this raid of Menodorus, both Octavius and Agrippa being absent. The latter had gone away to procure timber. In a spirit of bravado Menodorus ran his ship upon the soft ground, voluntarily and contemptuously, and pretended to be stuck in the mud, until his enemies dashed down from the mountains as to a certain prey, when he backed away, laughing, and left the soldiers of Octavius the victims of both chagrin and astonishment. When he had sufficiently shown what he was capable of, as enemy or friend, he dismissed a senator whom he had taken prisoner, named Rebillus, having a view already to the future.
During his former desertion he had been a friend of Mindius Marcellus, one of the companions of Octavius, and he now told his own men that Mindius had the intention of betraying his party and deserting to that of Pompeius. Then he drew near to the enemy and invited Mindius to go with him to a small island in order to have a conference. When the latter came, and there was nobody else within earshot, Menodorus said that he had gone back to Pompeius because he was ill-treated by the admiral of those days, Calvisius, but that since Agrippa had been appointed to the command of the fleet he would come back to Octavius, who had done him no wrong, if Mindius would bring him a safe-conduct from Messala, who was commanding in Agrippa’s absence. He said that on his return he would make amends for his fault by brilliant exploits, but that until the safe-conduct arrived he should be obliged to harass the forces of Octavius as before in order to avoid suspicion; and this he did. Messala hesitated on account of the baseness of the transaction, but he nevertheless yielded, either because he considered such things necessary in war, or because he had learned beforehand, or conjectured, the mind of Octavius. Menodorus at once deserted, and, upon the approach of Octavius, threw himself at his feet and begged that he would pardon him without asking for the reasons for his flight. Octavius conceded his safety on account of the pledges made, but had him secretly watched. He dismissed the captains of his triremes and allowed them to go wherever they pleased.
When the fleet was ready Octavius set sail again. He landed at Vibo and ordered Messala, who had two legions of infantry, to cross over to Sicily, join the army of Lepidus, pass through to the bay in front of Tauromenium, and station himself there. He sent three legions to Stylis and the extremity of the straits, to await events. He ordered Taurus to sail around from Tarentum to Mount Scylacium, which is opposite Tauromenium.The geography here is in confusion. Mount Scylacium is not opposite Tauromenium. Mendelssohn considers the text corrupt. Taurus did so, having prepared himself for fighting as well as for rowing. His infantry kept even pace with him, the cavalry reconnoitring by land and the liburnicas by sea. While he was making this movement Octavius, who had advanced from Vibo, made his appearance near Scylacium, and, after giving his approval to the good order of the forces, returned to Vibo. Pompeius, as I have already said, guarded all the landing-places on the island and retained his fleet at Messana, in order to send aid where it might be needed.
Such were the preparations of Octavius and Pompeius in this quarter. Meanwhile four more legions were en route to Lepidus from Africa in merchant ships, being the remainder of his army. Papias, one of Pompeius’ captains, threw himself in their way on the sea, and, after they had received him as a friend (for they thought that these were ships sent by Lepidus to meet them), destroyed them. Some ships were despatched by Lepidus later, and when these were approaching, the merchant ships that had escaped mistook them for other enemies and fled. So some of them were burned, some captured, some upset, and the rest returned to Africa. Two legions perished in the sea, or, if any of them could swim, Tisienus, the lieutenant of Pompeius, slew them when they reached the land. The other legions reëmbarked and joined Lepidus, some sooner and some later. Papias sailed back to Pompeius.
Octavius crossed from Vibo with his whole fleet to Strongyle,The modern Stromboli. one of the five Aeolian islands, having made a reconnoissance of the sea beforehand. Seeing large forces in front of him on the Sicilian shore at Pelorum, Mylae, and Tyndaris, he conjectured that Pompeius himself was there. So he left Agrippa in command and returned again to Vibo, and thence hastened with Messala and three legions to the camp of Taurus, intending to seize Tauromenium while Pompeius was still absent, and thus threaten him on two sides at once. In pursuance of this plan Agrippa moved forward from Strongyle to the island of Hiera, and as Pompeius’ garrison made no resistance he occupied it and intended on the following day to attack, at Mylae, Demochares, the lieutenant of Pompeius, who had forty ships. Pompeius observed the menacing attitude of Agrippa, and sent to Demochares from Messana forty-five ships, under the command of his freedman Apollophanes, and followed in person with seventy others.
Agrippa, with half of his ships, sailed out of Hiera before daylight in order to have a naval engagement with PapiasThis is evidently a copyist’s mistake for Demochares. The preceding section says that Demochares was in Agrippa’s front, and Dion Cassius (xlix. 2) tells us that the battle that took place here was between Agrippa and Demochares. Suetonius (Aug. 16) adds the name of Apollophanes. only. When he saw the fleet of Apollophanes also, and seventy ships on the other wing, he sent word to Octavius at once that Pompeius was at Mylae with the greater part of his naval forces. Then he placed himself with his heavy ships in the centre, and summoned the remainder of his fleet from Hiera in all haste. The preparations on both sides were superb. The ships had towers on both stem and stern. When the usual exhortation had been given and the standards raised, they rushed against each other, some coming bow on, others making flank attacks, the shouts of the men and the spray from the ships adding terror to the scene. The Pompeian ships were shorter and lighter, and better adapted to blockading and darting about. Those of Octavius were larger and heavier, and, consequently, slower, yet stronger to give blows and not so easily damaged. The Pompeian crews were better sailors than those of Octavius, but the latter were stronger. Accordingly, the former excelled not so much in close fighting as in the nimbleness of their movements, in breaking oar blades and rudders, cutting off oar handles, or separating the enemy’s ships entirely, doing them no less harm than by ramming. Those of Octavius sought to cut down with their beaks the hostile ships, which were smaller in size, or shatter them, or break through them. When they came to close quarters, being higher, they could hurl missiles down upon the enemy, and more easily throw the corvusThe corvus was a framework with a hook at its extremity. It was carried in an upright position on the prow and worked by a hinge at the bottom, and was used for the same purpose as the grappling-irons, to seize and hold fast the enemy’s ships. and the grappling-irons. The Pompeians, whenever they were overpowered in this manner, leaped into the sea and were picked up by their small boats, which were hovering around for this purpose.
Agrippa bore down directly upon Papias and struck his ship under the bow, shattering it and breaking a hole in the keel. The men in the towers were shaken down, the water rushed into the ship, and all the oarsmen on the lower benches were cut off. The others broke through the deck and escaped by swimming. Papias escaped to a ship alongside of his own, and returned to the battle. Pompeius, who observed from a mountain that his ships were making little headway, and that whenever they came to close quarters with the enemy they were denuded of fighting men, and that reinforcements were coming to Agrippa from Hiera, gave the signal to retire in good order. This they did, advancing and retreating little by little. Agrippa continued to bear down upon them, and they took refuge, not on the beach, but among the shoals formed in the sea by river deposits.
Agrippa’s pilots prevented him from running his large ships on the shoals. He cast anchor in the open sea, intending to blockade the enemy and to fight a battle by night if necessary; but his friends advised him not to be carried away by rashness and not to wear out his soldiers with excessive toil and want of sleep, and not to trust to that tempestuous sea. So in the evening he reluctantly withdrew. The Pompeians made sail to their harbors, having lost thirty of their ships, and sunk five of the enemy’s, and having inflicted considerable other damage and suffered as much in return. Pompeius praised his own men because they had resisted such formidable vessels, saying they had fought against walls rather than against ships; and he rewarded them as though they had been victorious. He encouraged them to believe that, as they were lighter, they would prevail over the enemy in the straits on account of the current. He said also that he would make some addition to the height of his ships. Such was the result of the naval battle at Mylae between Agrippa and Papias.
Pompeius suspected that Octavius had gone to the camp of Taurus for the purpose of attacking Tauromenium, which was the fact. So, directly after supper, he sailed to Messana, leaving a part of his forces at Mylae so that Agrippa might think that he was still there. Agrippa, as soon as his army was sufficiently rested, bestirred himself and set sail for Tyndaris, which had offered to surrender. He entered the town, but the garrison fought valiantly and drove him out. Some other towns espoused his cause and received his garrisons, and he returned that evening. In the meantime, Octavius had sailed from Scylacium to Leucopetra,The modern Capo dell’ Armi. having learned for a certainty that Pompeius had gone from Messana to Mylae on account of Agrippa. He was about to cross the straits from Leucopetra to Tauromenium by night, but learning of the sea-fight he changed his mind, thinking that a victor ought not to steal his passage, but to cross with his army boldly by daylight; for he was fully convinced that Pompeius was still confronting Agrippa. Looking down from the mountains upon the sea at daybreak and finding that it was clear of enemies, he set sail with as many troops as the ships could carry, leaving the rest with Messala until the fleet could return to him. Arriving at Tauromenium, he sent messengers to demand its surrender. As his guards were not admitted, he made sail to the river Onobalas and the temple of Venus, and moored his fleet at the shrine of the Archegetes, the god of the Naxians,The word Ἀρχηγέτης means the Founder, i.e., the founder of a colony. It was applied here to the god Apollo, in whose honor an altar and a small statue had been erected at Naxos (the modern Capo di Schiso), in Sicily. Immediately following this word in all the codices are the words ἀξιῶν τὸν θεὸν, in which Musgrave detected an error for Ναξίων τὸν θεὸν (the god of the Naxians). Schweighäuser was of the opinion that these words had been written as a marginal note on some copy and afterwards introduced into the text. Cluver in his Sicilia Antiqua points out an explanatory passage in Thucydides (vi. 3. r) of the following tenor: The Chalcideans were the first of the Greeks who sailed from Eubœa, under the leadership of Theucles, and built Naxos and erected the altar to Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside of the town, upon which the Theori, as often as they make voyages from Sicily, first offer sacrifice. The river Onobalas is now called the Cantara. intending to pitch his camp there and attack Tauromenium. The Archegetes is a small statue of Apollo, erected by the Naxians when they first migrated to Sicily.
When Octavius disembarked from his ship he slipped and fell, but arose without assistance. While he was yet laying out his camp, Pompeius made his appearance with a large fleet—an astounding spectacle, since Octavius believed that he had been beaten by Agrippa. Pompeius’ cavalry advanced at the same time, rivalling the fleet in rapidity of movement, and his infantry was seen on the other side. The forces of Octavius were terrified at finding themselves surrounded by enemies on three sides, and Octavius himself was alarmed because Messala could not join him. The cavalry of Pompeius assailed Octavius’ men while they were still fortifying their camp. If his infantry and his naval force had attacked simultaneously with the cavalry, Pompeius might have accomplished greater results, but, being inexperienced in war and ignorant of the panic among the troops of Octavius, and hesitating to begin a battle at the approach of nightfall, one part of his forces stationed themselves at the promontory of Coccynus,No promontory, or place, of this name is mentioned by any other ancient author, whose works have reached us. while his infantry, deeming it unwise to encamp near the enemy, withdrew to the town of Phœnix.This also is an unknown place, except as it is here mentioned. There was a Phœnicus Portus in Sicily, but it was too far distant from Tauromenium to be of service as here described. Night coming on they went to rest, and Octavius’ soldiers finished their camp, but were incapacitated for battle by toil and want of sleep. They consisted of three legions, and 500 cavalry without horses, 1000 light-armed, and 2000 colonists serving as allies, but not enrolled, besides his fleet.
Octavius placed all of his infantry under charge of Cornificius, and ordered him to drive back the enemy and do whatever the exigencye required. He took ship before daylight and went seaward lest the enemy should enclose him on this side also, giving the right wing of the fleet to Titinius and the left to Carcius, and embarking himself on a liburnica, with which he sailed around the whole fleet, exhorting them to have courage. Having done this he lowered the general’s ensign, as is customary in times of extreme danger. Pompeius put to sea against him, and they encountered each other twice, the battle ending with the night. Some of Octavius’ ships were captured and burned; others spread their small sails and made for the Italian coast, contrary to orders. Those of Pompeius followed them a short distance and then turned against the remainder, capturing some and burning others. Some of the crews swam ashore, most of whom were slaughtered or taken prisoners by Pompeius’ cavalry. Some of them set out to reach the camp of Cornificius, who sent only his light-armed troops to assist them as they came near, because he did not consider it prudent to move his disheartened legionaries against the enemy’s infantry, who were naturally much encouraged by their victory.
Octavius spent the greater part of the night among his small boats, in doubt whether he should go back to Cornificius through the scattered remains of his fleet, or take refuge with Messala. Providence brought him to the harbor of Abala with a single armor-bearer, without friends, attendants, or slaves. Certain persons, who had come down from the mountain to learn the news, found him suffering in body and mind and brought him in rowboats (changing from one to another for the purpose of concealment) to the camp of Messala, which was not far distant. Straightway, and before he had attended to his bodily wants, he despatched a liburnica to Cornificius, and sent word throughout the mountains that he was safe, and ordered all his forces to help Cornificius, and wrote to him that he would send him aid forthwith. After attending to his own person and taking a little rest, he set forth by night, accompanied by Messala, to Stylis, where Carinas was stationed with three legions ready to embark, and ordered him to set sail for Lipara,Lipara was one of the Aeolian islands lying north of Hiera, where Agrippa was stationed. to which place he would shortly follow. He wrote to Agrippa and urged him to send Laronius with an army to the rescue of Cornificius with all speed. He sent Maecenas again to Rome on account of the revolutionists; and some of these, who were stirring up disorder, were punished. He also sent Messala to Puteoli to bring the so-called first legion to Vibo.
This was the same Messala whom the triumvirs proscribed at Rome, and for the killing of whom money and freedom were offered as rewards. He had fled to Cassius and Brutus, and after their death had delivered his fleet to Antony, in pursuance of an agreement made between them. It seems fitting to recall this fact in honor of Roman magnanimity, inasmuch as Messala, when he had in his power, overwhelmed with misfortune, the man who had proscribed him, saved him and cared for him as his commander. Cornificius was able easily to defend his camp against attack; but, being in danger from want of supplies, he drew his men out for battle and challenged the enemy. But Pompeius did not care to come to an engagement with men whose only hope rested in battle and whom he expected to subdue by famine. Cornificius, having placed in the centre the unarmed men who had escaped to him from the ships, took to the road, grievously exposed to missiles in the open plains from the enemy’s horsemen and in the broken country from the light-armed troops from Numidia in Africa, who hurled darts from long distances and made their escape when charged by their enemies.
On the fourth day, with difficulty, they arrived at the waterless region which they say was formerly inundated by a stream of fire that ran down as far as the sea and dried up all the streams in the district. The inhabitants of the country traverse it only by night, on account of the stifling heat and the dust and ashes with which it abounds. Being ignorant of the roads and fearing ambush, Cornificius and his men did not dare to march through it by night, especially as there was no moon, nor could they endure the daytime, because of suffocation. Moreover, the bottoms of their feet were burned (especially those who had no shoes), as it was now the hottest part of the summer. On account of the tormenting thirst they could not delay. They could no longer charge upon their assailants, but received wounds without any means of defence. When they saw the place of exit from this burned district occupied by enemies, the able-bodied ones, heedless of their sick and barefooted companions, dashed at the defiles with amazing courage and overpowered the enemy with all their remaining strength. When they found the next defiles occupied by hostile forces they gave way to despair and succumbed to thirst and heat. Cornificius aroused them by showing them a spring of water near by; and again they overpowered the enemy, but with heavy loss to themselves. Another body of enemies held possession of the fountain, and now Cornificius’ men lost all courage and gave way completely.
While they were in this state Laronius, who had been sent by Agrippa with three legions, made his appearance a long way off. Although it was not yet plain that he was a friend, still, as they had been all the time hoping for something of this kind, they once more recovered their spirits. When they saw the enemy abandon the water in order not to be exposed to attack on both sides, they shouted for joy with all their strength. When the troops of Laronius shouted in return, they ran and seized the fountain. The leaders forbade the men to drink to excess. Some who neglected this advice died while drinking. In this unexpected manner did Cornificius, and what was left of his army, escape to Agrippa at Mylae.Dion Cassius (xlix. 6-7) gives an account, in many respects similar to this, of the terrible sufferings of Cornificius and his command in their march through Sicily, until rescued by Agrippa. The words at Mylae should be expunged. A few lines below we read that the garrison of Pompeius still held Mylae, and a little later that it was taken from him by Octavius.
Agrippa had just taken Tyndaris, a stronghold full of provisions and admirably situated for naval warfare. Thither Octavius transported his infantry and cavalry. He had in Sicily all together twenty-one legions of the former, 20,000 of the latter, and more than 5000 light-armed troops. The garrison of Pompeius still held Mylae, and all the places from Mylae to Naulochi and Pelorus, and all the coast. These garrisons, in fear of Agrippa, kept fires burning continually, signifying that they would set fire to any ships that should sail against them. Pompeius was also master of the defiles on both sides of the island. The mountain passes in the neighborhood of Tauromenium and around Mylae were fortified by him, and he harassed Octavius when the latter was making a forward movement from Tyndaris, but not coming to an engagement. Believing that Agrippa was moving his fleet against him, Pompeius changed his position to Pelorus, abandoning the defiles around Mylae; and Octavius occupied them and also Mylae and Artemisium, a very small town, in which, they say, were the cattle of the Sun and where Ulysses fell asleep.Odyssey, xii. 338.