Book 2
Caesar hastened to Rome. He found the people shuddering with recollection of the horrors of Marius and Sulla and he cheered them with the prospect and promise of clemency. In proof of his kindness to his enemies, he said that he had taken Lucius Domitius prisoner and allowed him to go away unharmed with his money. Nevertheless, he broke the bolts of the public treasury, and when Metellus, one of the tribunes, tried to prevent him from entering, threatened him with death. He took away money hitherto untouched, which, they say, had been deposited there long ago, at the time of the Gallic invasion, with a public curse upon anybody who should take it out except in case of a war with the Gauls. Caesar said that he had subjugated the Gauls completely and thus released the commonwealth from the curse. He then placed Aemilius Lepidus in charge of the city, and the tribune, Mark Antony, in charge of Italy and of the army guarding it. Outside of Italy he chose Curio to take command of Sicily in place of Cato,The preceding section says that Asinius Pollio was sent to take command of Sicily. Caesar himself says (i. 30) that he sent Curio to Sicily with three legions and ordered him, when he had recovered that island, to transport his army immediately to Africa. He adds that Cato was energetically preparing for war by land and sea, but that when he was advised of Curio’s approach he fled from his province. and Quintus Valerius for Sardinia. He sent Gaius Antonius to Illyria and intrusted Cisalpine Gaul to Licinius Crassus. He ordered the building of two fleets with all speed, one in the Adriatic and the other in the Tyrrhenian sea, and appointed Hortensius and Dolabella their admirals while they were still under construction.
Having prevailed so far as to make Italy inaccessible to Pompey, Caesar went to Spain, where he encountered Petreius and Afranius, Pompey’s lieutenants, and was worsted by them at first and afterward had an indecisive engagement with them near the town of Ilerda.The modern Lerida. He pitched his camp on some high ground and obtained his supplies by means of a bridge across the river Sicoris.The modern Segre. Suddenly a freshet of melting snow carried away his bridge and cut off a great number of his men on the opposite side. These were destroyed by the forces of Petreius. Caesar himself, with the rest of his army, suffered very severely from the difficulty of the place, from hunger, from the weather, and from the enemy, his situation being in no wise different from that of a siege. Finally, on the approach of summer, Afranius and Petreius withdrew to the interior of Spain to recruit more soldiers, but Caesar continually anticipated them, blocked their passage, and prevented their advance. He also surrounded one of their divisions that had been sent forward to capture his camp. They raised their shields over their heads in token of surrender, but Caesar neither captured nor slaughtered them, but allowed them to go back to Afranius unharmed, after his usual manner of winning the favor of his enemies. Whence it came to pass that there was continual intercourse between the camps and talk of reconciliation among the rank and file.
To Afranius and some of the other officers it now seemed best to abandon Spain to Caesar, provided they could go unharmed to Pompey. Petreius opposed this and ran through the camp killing those of Caesar’s men whom he found holding communication with his own. He even slew with his own hand one of his officers who tried to restrain him. Moved by these acts of severity on the part of Petreius, the minds of the soldiers were still more attracted to the clemency of Caesar. Soon afterward Caesar managed to cut off the enemy’s access to water, and Petreius was compelled by necessity to come with Afranius to a conference with Caesar between the two armies. Here it was agreed that they should abandon Spain to Caesar, and that he should conduct them unharmed to the other side of the river VarusThe modern Var. It rises in the Maritime Alps and empties into the Mediterranean near Nice. and allow them to proceed thence to Pompey. Arrived at this stream, Caesar called a meeting of all those who were from Rome or Italy and addressed them as follows: My enemies (for by still using this term I shall make my meaning clearer to you), I did not destroy those of you who surrendered to me when you had been sent to seize my camp, nor the rest of your army when I had cut you off from water, although Petreius had previously slaughtered those of my men who were intercepted on the other side of the river Sicoris. If there is any gratitude among you for these favors tell them to all of Pompey’s soldiers. After speaking thus he dismissed them uninjured, and he appointed Quintus Cassius governor of Spain. So much for the operations of Caesar.This is a very meagre account of the Ilerda campaign. That of Plutarch is still more so. A detailed narrative of it is given by Caesar himself (i. 37-87), showing how he manœuvred the enemy into a surrender without coming to a general engagement.
Attius Varus commanded the Pompeian forces in Africa, and Juba, king of the Mauritanian Numidians, was in alliance with him. Curio sailed from Sicily against them in behalf of Caesar with two legions, twelve war vessels, and a number of ships of burden. He landed at Utica and put to flight a body of Numidian horse in a small cavalry engagement near that place, and allowed himself to be saluted as Imperator by the soldiers with their arms still in their hands. This title is an honor conferred upon generals by their soldiers, who thus testify that they consider them worthy to be their commanders. In the olden time the generals accepted this honor only for the greatest exploits. At present I understand that the distinction is limited to cases where at least 10,000 of the enemy have been killed. While Curio was crossing from Sicily the inhabitants of Africa thinking that, in emulation of the glory of Scipio, he would establish his quarters near the camp of the latter, poisoned the water in the neighborhood. Their expectation was fulfilled. Curio encamped there and his army immediately fell sick. When they drank the water their eyesight became dim as in a mist, and sleep with torpor ensued, and after that frequent vomiting and spasms of the whole body. For this reason Curio changed his camp to the neighborhood of Utica itself, leading his enfeebled army through an extensive marshy region. But when they received the news of Caesar’s victory in Spain they took courage and put themselves in order of battle in a narrow space along the seashore. Here a severe battle was fought in which Curio lost only one man, while Varus lost 600 killed, besides a still larger number wounded.This story, with its incredible disproportion of loss, is related also by Caesar (ii. 35), who tells us that Varus had the advantage of position.
Meantime, while Juba was advancing a false report preceded him, that he had turned back at the river Bagradas, which was not far distant, because his kingdom had been invaded by his neighbors, and that he had left Saburra, his general, with a small force at the river. Curio believed this report and about the third hour of a hot summer day led the greater part of his army against Saburra by a sandy road destitute of water; for even if there were any streams there in winter they were now dried up by the heat of the sun. He found the river in possession of Saburra and of the king himself. Disappointed in his expectation Curio retreated to some hills, oppressed by fatigue, heat, and thirst. When the enemy beheld him in this condition they crossed the river prepared for fight. Curio despised the danger and very imprudently led his enfeebled army down to the plain, where he was surrounded by the Numidian horse. Here for some time he sustained the attack by retiring slowly and drawing his men together into a small space, but being much distressed he retreated again to the hills. Asinius Pollio, at the beginning of the trouble, had retreated with a small force to the camp at Utica lest Varus should make an attack upon it as soon as he should hear the news of the disaster at the river. Curio perished fighting bravely, together with all his men, not one returning to Utica after Pollio. Such was the result of the battle at the river Bagradas. Curio’s head was cut off and carried to Juba.
As soon as the news of this disaster reached the camp at Utica, Flamma, the admiral, fled, fleet and all, not taking a single one of the land forces on board, but Pollio rowed out in a small boat to the merchant ships that were lying at anchor near by and besought them to come to the shore and take the army on board. Some of them did so by night. The soldiers came aboard in such crowds that some of the small boats were sunk. Of those who were carried out to sea, and who had money with them, many were thrown overboard by the merchants for the sake of the money. So much for those who put to sea, but similar calamities, while it was still night, befell those who remained on shore. At daybreak they surrendered themselves to Varus, but Juba came up and, having collected them under the walls, put them all to the sword, claiming that they were the remainder of his victory, and paying no attention to the remonstrances of even Varus. Thus the two Roman legions that sailed to Africa with Curio were totally destroyed, together with the cavalry, the light-armed troops, and the servants belonging to the army. Juba, after vaunting his great exploit to Pompey, returned home.
About this time [Gaius] Antonius was defeated in Illyria by Pompey’s lieutenant, Octavius, and another army of Caesar mutinied at Placentia, crying out against their officers for prolonging the war and not paying them the five minaeThe silver mina was equal to about $18 of our money. that Caesar had promised them as a donative while they were still at Brundusium. When Caesar heard of this he flew from Massilia to Placentia and coming before the soldiers, who were still in a state of mutiny, addressed them as follows: You know what kind of speed I use in everything I undertake. This war is not prolonged by us, but by the enemy, who have fled from us. You reaped great advantages from my command in Gaul, and you took an oath to me for the whole of this war and not for a part only; and now you abandon us in the midst of our labors, you revolt against your officers, you propose to give orders to those from whom you are bound to receive orders. Being myself the witness of my liberality to you heretofore I shall now execute the law of our countryThe Greek text in several old MSS. at this place reads Πετρηίῳ νόμῳ which supposes a Petreian law totally unknown in Roman history. Casaubon was the first to perceive that it ought to read πατρίῳ νόμῳ instead of πετρηίῳ. Tollius sustained the correction of Casaubon and the MS. of the library of Augsburg and that of Venice, verified by Schweighäuser, have confirmed it. (Combes-Dounous.) The phrase occurs again in Sec. 63 infra. by decimating the ninth legion, where this mutiny began. Straightway a cry went up from the whole legion, and the officers threw themselves at Caesar’s feet in supplication. Caesar yielded little by little and so far remitted the punishment as to designate 120 only (who seemed to have been the leaders of the revolt), and chose twelve of these by lot to be put to death. One of the twelve proved that he was absent when the conspiracy was formed, and Caesar put to death in his stead the centurion who had accused him.
After thus quelling the mutiny at Placentia Caesar proceeded to Rome, where the trembling people chose him dictator without any decree of the Senate and without the intervention of a magistrate. But he, either deprecating the office as likely to prove invidious or not desiring it, after holding it only eleven days (as some say) designated himself and Publius Isauricus as consuls.Caesar says that while he was at Massilia he learned that a law had been passed for creating a dictator and that he had been named for that office by Marcus Lepidus, the praetor. He appointed or changed the governors of provinces according to his own pleasure. He assigned Marcus Lepidus to Spain, Aulus Albinius to Sicily, Sextus Peducaeus to Sardinia, and Decimus Brutus to the newly acquired Gaul. He distributed corn to the suffering people and at their petition he allowed the return of all exiles except Milo. When he was asked to decree an abolition of debts, on the ground that the wars and seditions had caused a fall of prices, he refused it, but appointed appraisers of vendible goods which debtors might give to their creditors instead of money.Caesar’s account of this matter is as follows: Since credit was at a low ebb in the whole of Italy and debts could not be paid in money, Caesar decided that arbiters should be appointed to appraise the property and possessions of the debtors at their value before the war and hand them over to the creditors. (Civil War, iii. I.) When this had been done, about the winter solstice, he sent for his whole army to rendezvous at Brundusium and he himself took his departure in the month of December, according to the Roman calendar, not waiting for the beginning of his consulship on the calends of the new year, which was close at hand. The people followed him to the city gates, urging him to come to an arrangement with Pompey, for it was evident that whichever of them should conquer would wield sovereign power. Caesar departed on his journey and travelled with all possible speed.
In the meantime Pompey was using all diligence to build ships and collect additional forces of men and money. He captured forty of Caesar’s ships in the Adriatic and guarded against his crossing. He disciplined his army and took part in the exercises of both infantry and cavalry, and was foremost in everything, notwithstanding his age. In this way he readily gained the good-will of his soldiers; and the people flocked to see Pompey’s military drills as to a spectacle. Caesar at that time had ten legions of infantry and 10,000 Gallic horse. Pompey had five legions from Italy, with which he had crossed the Adriatic, and the cavalry belonging to them; also the two surviving legions that had served with Crassus in the Parthian war and a certain part of those who had made the incursion into Egypt with Gabinius, making altogether eleven legions of Italian troops and about 7000 horse. He had auxiliaries also from Ionia, Macedonia, Peloponnesus, and Bœotia, Cretan archers, Thracian slingers, and Pontic javelin-throwers. He had also some Gallic horse and others from Galatia in the east, together with Commageneans sent by Antiochus, Cilicians, Cappadocians, some from Lesser Armenia, also Pamphylians and Pisidians. Pompey did not intend to use all these for fighting. Some were employed in garrison duty, in building fortifications, and in other service for the Italian soldiers, so that none of the latter should be kept away from the battles. Such were Pompey’s land forces. He had 600 war-ships perfectly equipped, of which about 100 were manned by Romans and were understood to be much superior to the rest. He also had a great number of transports and ships of burthen. There were numerous naval commanders for the different divisions, and Marcus Bibulus had the chief command over all.
When all was in readiness Pompey called the senators, the knights, and the whole army to an assembly and addressed them as follows: Fellow-soldiers, the Athenians, too, abandoned their city for the sake of liberty when they were fighting against invasion, because they believed that it was not houses that made a city, but men; and after they had done so they presently recovered it and made it more renowned than even before. So, too, our own ancestors abandoned the city when the Gauls invaded it, and Camillus hasted from Ardea and recovered it. All men of sound mind think that their country is wherever they can preserve their liberty. Because we were thus minded we sailed hither, not as deserters of our native land, but in order to prepare ourselves to defend it gloriously against one who has long conspired against it, and, by means of bribe-takers, has at last seized Italy by a sudden invasion, and whom you have decreed a public enemy. He now sends governors to take charge of your provinces. He appoints others over the city and still others throughout Italy. With such audacity has he deprived the people of their own government. If he does these things while the war is still raging and while he is apprehensive of the result and when we intend, with a god’s help, to bring him to punishment, what cruelty, what violence is he likely to abstain from if he wins the victory? And while he is doing these things against the fatherland certain men, who have been bought with money that he obtained from our province of Gaul, coöperate with him, choosing to be his slaves instead of his equals.
I have not failed and I never will fail to fight with you and for you. I give you my services both as soldier and as general. If I have had any experience in war, if it has been my good fortune to remain unvanquished to this day, I pray the gods to continue all these blessings in our present need and that I may become a man of destiny for my country in her perils as I was in extending her dominion. Surely we may trust in the gods and in the righteousness of the war, which has for its noble and just object the defence of our country’s constitution. In addition to this we may rely upon the magnitude of the preparations which we behold on land and sea, which are all the time growing and will be augmented still more as soon as we come into action. We may say that all the nations of the East and around the Euxine Sea, both Greek and barbarian, stand with us, and the kings, who are friends of the Roman people or of myself, are supplying us soldiers, arms, provisions, and other implements of war. Come to your task then with a spirit worthy of your country, of yourselves, and of me, mindful of the wrongs you have received from Caesar, and ready to obey my orders promptly.
When Pompey had thus spoken the whole army, including the senators and a great many of the nobility who were with him, applauded him vociferously and told him to lead them wherever he would. Pompey thought that as the weather was bad and the sea boisterous Caesar would not attempt to cross till the end of winter, but would be occupied in the meantime with his duties as consul. So he ordered his naval officers to keep watch of the sea, and then divided his army and sent it into winter quarters in Thessaly and Macedonia. So heedlessly did Pompey form his judgment of what was about to take place. Caesar, as I have already said, hastened to Brundusium about the winter solstice, intending to strike terror into his enemies by taking them by surprise. Although he found neither provisions, nor apparatus, nor his whole army collected at Brundusium, he, nevertheless, called those who were present to an assembly and addressed them as follows:—
Fellow-soldiers,—you who are joined with me in the greatest of undertakings,—neither the winter weather, nor the delay of our comrades, nor the want of suitable preparation shall check my onset. I consider rapidity of movement the best substitute for all these things. I think that we who are first at the rendezvous should leave behind us here our servants, our pack-animals, and all our apparatus in order that the ships which are here may take us on board and carry us over at once without the enemy’s knowledge. Let us oppose our good fortune to the winter weather, our courage to the smallness of our numbers, and to our want of supplies the abundance of the enemy, which will be ours to take as soon as we touch the land, if we realize that nothing is ours unless we conquer. Let us go then and possess ourselves of their servants, their apparatus, their provisions, while they are spending the winter under cover. Let us go while Pompey thinks that I am spending my time in winter quarters also, or in processions and sacrifices appertaining to my consulship. It is needless to tell you that the most potent thing in war is the unexpected. It will be glorious for us to carry off the first honors of the coming conflict and to prepare a safe pathway yonder for those who will immediately follow us. For my part I would rather now be sailing than talking, so that I may come in Pompey’s sight while he thinks me engaged in my official duties at Rome. Although I am certain that you agree with me I await your response.Caesar’s account of his own speech is much briefer, viz: When Caesar arrived at Brundusium he addressed his soldiers saying that since they were almost at the end of their labors and perils they should be content to leave their slaves and impedimenta in Italy and embark themselves in the ships in light order so that a greater number of troops could be transported, and that they might expect everything from victory and his liberality. (iii. 6.)
The whole army cried out with enthusiasm that he should lead on. Caesar at once led, from the platform to the seashore, five legions of foot-soldiers and 600 chosen horse, but as a storm came up he was obliged to cast anchor. It was now the winter solstice and the wind kept him back, against his will, and held him in Brundusium, to his great disappointment, until the first day of the new Y.R. 706 year.Caesar says that he sailed on the fourth day of January. In the meantime two more legions arrived and B.C. 48 Caesar embarked these also and started in the winter time on merchant ships, for he had only a few war-ships and these were guarding Sardinia and Sicily. The ships were driven by the winds to the Ceraunian Mountains and Caesar sent them back immediately to bring the rest of the army.Caesar tells of another effort which he made for peace by sending Vibullius Rufus to Pompey with a proposal that both should disband their armies within three days. Pompey refused to discuss the proposal, saying: Of what use to me is life or citizenship if I shall seem to owe them to the benefaction of Caesar, a belief which will never be erased if it is supposed that I am thus brought back to Italy from which I departed. (iii. 10-18.) He then marched by night against the town of Oricum by a rough and narrow path, with his force divided in several parts on account of the difficulties of the road, so that if his army had been anticipated he might have been easily beaten. With much trouble he got his detachments together about daylight and the commander of the garrison of Oricum, having been forbidden by the townsmen to oppose the entrance of a Roman consul, delivered the keys of the place to Caesar and remained with him in a position of honor. Lucretius and Minucius, who were on the other side of Oricum with eighteen war-ships guarding merchant ships loaded with corn for Pompey, sunk the latter to prevent them from falling into Caesar’s hands, and fled to Dyrrachium. From Oricum Caesar hastened to Apollonia,The modern Pollina. It was situated on the southern border of Illyria. The Egnatian Way, the Roman military road to Macedonia and the East, ran from Apollonia and Dyrrachium to Thessalonica. (Strabo, vii. 7, 4.) the inhabitants of which received him. Straberius, the commander of the garrison, abandoned the city.
Caesar assembled his army and congratulated them on the success they had achieved by their rapid movement in mid-winter, on conquering such a sea without war-ships, on taking Oricum and Apollonia without a fight, and on capturing the enemy’s supplies, as he had predicted, without Pompey’s knowledge. If we can anticipate him in reaching Dyrrachium, his military arsenal, he added, we shall be in possession of all the things they have collected by the labors of a whole summer. After speaking thus he led his soldiers directly toward Dyrrachium over a long road, not stopping day or night. Pompey, being advised beforehand, marched toward the same place from MacedoniaCaesar says that Pompey was at Candavia. This was the name of a mountain range also. It was situated on the Egnatian Way in Illyria and was nearer to Dyrrachium than Apollonia was. Caesar’s course took him northwardly to a junction with the main road about midway between Candavia and Dyrrachium. Pompey going westward passed this junction first and had Caesar in his rear. with extreme haste also, cutting down trees along the road, in order to obstruct Caesar’s passage, destroying bridges, and setting fire to all the supplies he met with, considering it of the greatest importance (as it was) to defend his own arsenal. If either of them saw any dust, or fire, or smoke at a distance they thought it was caused by the other, and they strove like athletes in a race. They did not allow themselves time for food or sleep. All was haste and eagerness mingled with the shouts of guides who carried torches, causing tumult and fear as when hostile armies are ever drawing nearer and nearer to each other. Some of the soldiers from fatigue threw away their loads. Others hid themselves in ravines and were left behind, exchanging their fear of the enemy for a moment’s rest.
In the midst of such vicissitudes on either side Pompey arrived first at Dyrrachium and encamped near it. He sent a fleet and retook Oricum and kept the strictest watch on the sea. Caesar pitched his camp so that the river AlorCaesar and all other authorities say the river Apsus. ran between himself and Pompey. By crossing the stream they had occasional cavalry skirmishes with each other. The armies did not come to a general engagement, however, for Pompey was still exercising his new levies and Caesar waited for the forces left at Brundusium. The latter apprehended that if these should sail in merchant ships in the spring they would not escape Pompey’s triremes, which would be patrolling the sea, as guard ships, in great numbers, but if they should cross in winter while the enemy were lying inside among the islands they might perhaps be unnoticed, or might force their way by the strength of the wind and the size of their ships. So he sent orders to them to hasten. As they did not come he decided to cross over secretly to that army, because no one else could bring them so easily. He concealed his intention and sent three servants to the river, a distance of twelve stades, to procure a fast-sailing vessel and a first rate pilot as for a messenger sent by Caesar.
Then he rose from supper pretending to be fatigued and told his friends to remain at the table. He put on the clothing of a private person, stepped into a chariot, and drove away to the ship, pretending to be the one sent by Caesar. He gave the rest of his orders through his servants and remained concealed by the darkness of the night and unrecognized. As there was a severe wind blowing the servants told the pilot to be of good courage and seize this opportunity to avoid the enemy who were in the neighborhood. The pilot made his way down the river by rowing. When they came toward the mouth they found it broken into surf by the wind and the sea. The pilot at the instigation of the servants put forth all his efforts, but as he could make no progress he became fatigued and gave it up. Then Caesar threw off his disguise and called out to him, Brave the tempest with a stout heart, you carry Caesar and Caesar’s fortunes. Both the rowers and the pilot were astounded and all took fresh courage and gained the mouth of the river, but the wind and waves cast the ship high on the bank. As the dawn was near and they feared lest the enemy should discover them in the daylight, Caesar, after accusing his evil genius for its invidiousness, allowed the ship to return, and it sailed up the river with a strong wind.This incident is related by Plutarch, Florus, Valerius Maximus, and Suetonius, but not by Caesar himself.
Some of Caesar’s friends were astonished at this act of bravery; others blamed him, saying that it was a deed becoming a soldier but not a general. As Caesar saw that he could not conceal a second attempt he ordered Postumius to sail to Brundusium in his place and tell Gabinius to cross over with the army immediately, and if he did not obey, to give the same order to Antony, and if he failed then to give it to Calenus. Another letter was written to the whole army in case all three should hesitate, saying, that every one who was willing to do so should follow Postumius on shipboard and sail to any place where the wind might carry them, and not to mind what happened to the ships, because Caesar did not want ships but men. Thus did Caesar put his trust in fortune rather than in prudence.Caesar’s account of this matter is as follows: As these things made Caesar anxious he wrote more imperatively to his forces at Brundusium that they should not omit the opportunity of the first favorable wind for sailing, and that they should direct their course either to the shore of Apollonia, or to that of the Labeates, because there they might beach their ships. These places were not frequented by the enemy’s blockading fleet because they dared not venture very far from their harbors. (iii. 25.) Pompey, in order to anticipate Caesar’s reënforcements, made haste and led his army forward prepared for battle. While two of his soldiers were searching in midstream for the best place to cross the river, one of Caesar’s men attacked and killed them both, whereupon Pompey drew back, as he considered this event inauspicious. All of his friends blamed him for missing this capital opportunity.
When Postumius arrived at Brundusium Gabinius did not obey the order, but led those who were willing to go with him by way of Illyria by forced marches. Almost all of them were destroyed by the Illyrians and Caesar was obliged to endure the outrage on account of his preoccupation. Antony embarked the remainder of the army and sailed for Apollonia with a favorable wind. About noon the wind failed and twenty of Pompey’s ships, that had put out to search the sea, discovered and pursued them. There was great fear on Caesar’s vessels lest in this calm the warships of the enemy should ram them with their prows and sink them. They prepared themselves for battle and began to discharge stones and darts, when suddenly the wind sprang up stronger than before, filled their great sails unexpectedly, and enabled them to complete their voyage without fear. The pursuers were left behind and they suffered severely from the wind and waves in the narrow sea and were scattered along a harborless and rocky coast. With difficulty they captured two of Caesar’s ships that ran on a shoal. Antony brought the remainder to the port of Nymphaeum.This adventure is described in similar terms but at greater length by Caesar, who says that the pursuing ships, sixteen in number, were driven upon the shore and wrecked, without a single exception, and that their crews were either killed by being dashed on the rocks or captured by his own men. The survivors, who were Rhodians, were all sent home unharmed. The loss of two of Antony’s fleet is described differently. These two became separated from the main body, lost their way and came to anchor in front of Lissus three miles south of Nymphaeum. Here they were attacked by another detachment of Pompey’s naval force. One of them, containing 220 new recruits, surrendered on the promise of safety, but they were all put to the sword as soon as they reached land. The other containing 200 veterans was beached and the occupants reached the shore where they defeated a detachment of Pompey’s horse and made their way to Caesar. (iii. 26-28.)
Now Caesar had his whole army together and so had Pompey his. They encamped opposite each other on hills in numerous redoubts. There were frequent collisions around each of these redoubts while they were making lines of circumvallation and trying to cut off each other’s supplies. In one of these fights in front of a redoubt Caesar’s men were worsted, and a centurion, of the name of Scaeva, while performing many deeds of valor, was wounded in the eye with a dart. He advanced in front of his men beckoning with his hand as though he wished to say something. When silence was obtained he called out to one of Pompey’s centurions, who was likewise distinguished for bravery, Save one of your equals, save your friend, send somebody to lead me by the hand, for I am wounded. Two soldiers advanced to him thinking that he was a deserter. One of these he killed before the stratagem was discovered and he cut off the shoulder of the other. This he did because he despaired of saving himself and his redoubt. His men, moved by shame at this act of self-devotion, rushed forward and saved the redoubt. Minucius, the commander of the post, also suffered severely. It is said that he received 120 missiles on his shield, was wounded six times, and, like Scaeva, lost an eye.Caesar says that it was the shield of Scaeva that was pierced in 120 places and that Caesar rewarded him with a large sum of money and promoted him to be the first centurion instead of the eighth. Caesar honored them both with many military gifts. A certain man of Dyrrachium having offered to betray the town to him, Caesar went by agreement with a small force by night to the gates at the temple of Artemis.There is a lacuna in the text at this place but it is filled by Dio Cassius (xli. 50), who relates the same event thus: Caesar, having attempted to corrupt the defenders, advanced by night to Dyrrachium itself by a narrow passage between a marsh and the sea, expecting that it would be betrayed. There he was attacked by a large force in front and by another in the rear. The latter were conveyed in ships and fell upon him unexpectedly. He lost many of his men and narrowly escaped himself. . . . The same winter Pompey’s father-in-law (Scipio) advanced with another army from Syria. Caesar’s general, Gaius Calvisius, had an engagement with him in Macedonia, was beaten, and lost a whole legion except 800 men.
As Caesar could obtain no supplies by sea, on account of Pompey’s naval superiority, his army began to suffer from hunger and was compelled to make bread from herbs.Both Plutarch and Caesar say roots. Those who were away from the fortifications, says the latter, found a kind of root which is called chara, which, mixed with milk, greatly relieved their want of food. They fashioned it into the similitude of bread, and they had abundance of it. (iii. 48.) When deserters brought loaves of this kind to Pompey, thinking that he would be gladdened by the spectacle, he was not at all pleased, but said, What kind of wild beasts are we fighting with? Then Caesar, compelled by necessity, drew his whole army together in order to force Pompey to fight even against his will. The latter occupied a number of the redoubts that Caesar had vacated and remained quiet. Caesar was greatly vexed at this and ventured upon an extremely difficult and chimerical task; that is, to carry a line of circumvallation around the whole of Pompey’s positions from sea to sea, thinking that even if he should fail he would acquire great renown from the boldness of the enterprise.Caesar says that his reasons for this were threefold: to prevent Pompey from interfering with his foragers, to prevent Pompey himself from foraging, and to destroy his prestige by showing him to the world besieged, and as one who dared not fight in the open. (iii. 43.) The circuit was 1200 stades.The text here is probably corrupt. The distance mentioned is equal to 133 miles. Caesar (iii. 63) says that it was 17 miles; Florus (iv. 2) says 16 miles. So, great was the work that Caesar undertook. Pompey built a line of countervallation. Thus they parried each other’s efforts. Nevertheless, they fought one great battle in which Pompey defeated Caesar in the most brilliant manner and pursued his men in headlong flight to his camp and took many of his standards. The eagle (the standard held in highest honor by the Romans) was saved with difficulty, the bearer having just time to throw it over the palisade to those within.
While this remarkable defeat was in progress Caesar brought up other troops from another quarter, but these also fell into a panic even when they beheld Pompey still far distant. Although they were already close to the gates they would neither make a stand, nor enter in good order, nor obey the commands given to them, but all fled pell-mell without shame, without orders, without reason. Caesar ran among them and with reproaches showed them that Pompey was still far distant, yet under his very eye some threw down their standards and fled, while others bent their gaze upon the ground in shame and did nothing; so great consternation had befallen them. One of the standard bearers, with his standard reversed, dared to thrust the end of it at Caesar himself, but the attendants of the latter cut him down. When the soldiers entered the camp they did not station any guards. All precautions were neglected and the fortification was left unprotected, so that it is probable that Pompey might then have captured it and brought the war to an end by that one engagement had not Labienus, misled by a god, persuaded him to pursue the fugitives instead. Moreover Pompey himself hesitated, either because he suspected a stratagem when he saw the gates unguarded or because he considered the war already decided by this battle. So he turned against those outside of the camp and made a heavy slaughter and took twenty-eight standards in the two engagements of this day, but he here missed his second opportunity to give the finishing stroke to the war. It is reported that Caesar said, The war would have been ended to-day in the enemy’s favor if they had had a commander who knew how to make use of a victory.Caesar’s account of the battle of Dyrrachium and of the causes of his defeat is embodied in Sections 59-71, Book iii. Two Allobrogian cavalry officers deserted to Pompey because they had been detected embezzling the pay of their own troops. They informed Pompey that a section of Caesar’s line of circumvallation was still unfinished. It was through this gap that Pompey made his sally at daybreak, taking Caesar’s forces by surprise and throwing them into a panic. The two engagements in one day, to which Appian refers, were the fight which took place at this gap, and the subsequent one when Caesar brought up reinforcements and made a counter attack which ended disastrously by reason of one of those accidents common in war. The ruin of Caesar’s army would have been complete, he says, had not Pompey suspected an ambuscade and therefore desisted from an attack on Caesar’s fortified camp. Caesar acknowledges the loss of 32 military tribunes and centurions and 969 soldiers besides several Roman knights whom he names. Excellent diagrams of these operations and of the fighting around Dyrrachium, as well as of the battle of Pharsalus, are given in the military history of Caesar by Col. Theodore Ayrault Dodge.
Pompey sent letters to all the kings and cities magnifying his victory, and he expected that Caesar’s army would come over to him directly, conceiving that it was oppressed by hunger and cast down by defeat, and especially the officers because apprehensive of punishment for their bad conduct in the battle. But the latter, as though some god had brought them to repentance, were ashamed of their fault, and as Caesar chided them gently and granted them pardon, they became still more angry with themselves and by a surprising change demanded that they should be decimated according to the law of their country. When Caesar did not agree to this they were still more mortified, and acknowledged that he had been shamefully treated by them. They cried out that he should at least put the standard bearers to death because they themselves would never have run away unless the standards had turned in flight first. Caesar would not consent to this, but he reluctantly punished a few. So great was the zeal excited among all by his moderation that they demanded to be led against the enemy immediately. They urged him vehemently, beseeching and promising to wipe out their disgrace by a splendid victory. Of their own accord they visited each other in military order and took an oath by companies, under the eye of Caesar himself, that they would not leave the field of battle except as victors.This agrees with the account given by Caesar himself of what took place in his camp after his defeat at Dyrrachium. He made a speech to his soldiers in which he dwelt on the great success they had achieved prior to the last battle, and said that if all their efforts had not been equally successful they must repair the defects of Fortune with greater industry. But whether their own panic, he continued, or some mistake, or Fortune itself had snatched from them a victory already gained and assured, the utmost effort should be made so that the disaster incurred might be repaired by their bravery. If this were done the loss they had suffered would redound to their advantage, as had been the case at Gergovia (in Gaul), and those who had been timid in fighting before would now go into battle fearlessly. (iii. 73.)
Wherefore Caesar’s friends urged him to avail himself of the army’s repentance and eagerness promptly, but he said in the hearing of the host, that he would take a better opportunity to lead them against the enemy, and he exhorted them to be mindful of their present zeal. He privately admonished his friends that it was necessary first for the soldiers to recover from the very great alarm of their recent defeat, and for the enemy to lose something of their present high confidence. He confessed also that he had made a mistake in encamping before Dyrrachium where Pompey had abundance of supplies, whereas he ought to have drawn him to some place where he would be subject to the same scarcity as themselves. After saying this he marched directly to Apollonia and from there to Thessaly, advancing by night in order to conceal his movements. The small town of GomphiThis could not have been a small town if it furnished the amount of food and wine which the text implies. Caesar speaks of it as oppido pleno atque opulento. to which he came refused to open its gates to him, and he took it by storm and allowed his army to plunder it. The soldiers, who had suffered much from hunger, stuffed themselves immoderately and drank wine to excess. The Germans among them were especially ridiculous under the influence of drink. It seems probable that Pompey might have attacked them then and gained another victory had he not disdainfully neglected a close pursuit. After seven days of rapid marching Caesar encamped near Pharsalus. It is said that among the notable calamities of Gomphi the bodies of twenty venerable men of the first rank were found lying on the floor in an apothecary’s shop, not wounded, and with goblets near them, as though they were drunk, and that one of them, like a physician, was seated in a chair and had dealt out poison to them.This incident contains a whole volume of the horrors of war to non-combatants in the ancient world. Here was a prosperous town of Thessaly blotted out of existence in a few hours’ time. Caesar says that the Thessalians at first espoused his cause but that they turned against him when they heard of his defeat at Dyrrachium. Naturally so. As they had no interest in the quarrel they were bound to be on the stronger side if they knew which it was. Their principal citizens guessed wrong, their town was destroyed, and they committed suicide in consequence. This was only one case among thousands.
After Caesar had withdrawn Pompey called a council of war, at which Afranius advised that they should make use of their naval force in which they were much superior, and being masters of the sea should harass Caesar, who was now wandering and destitute, and that Pompey himself should conduct his infantry with all haste to Italy, which was well disposed toward him and was now free from a hostile army. Having mastered it, together with Gaul and Spain, they could attack Caesar again from their own home, the seat of imperial power. Although this was the best possible advice Pompey disregarded it and allowed himself to be persuaded by those who said that Caesar’s army would presently desert to him on account of hunger, and that there was not much left of it anyway after the victory of Dyrrachium. They said it would be disgraceful to abandon the pursuit of Caesar when he was in flight, and for the victor to flee as though vanquished.Both Plutarch and Caesar give entertaining accounts of what took place in Pompey’s camp after Caesar’s retreat. They cried out, says the former, that Caesar had fled. Some wanted to pursue him, others to cross over to Italy. Others despatched their friends and servants to Rome to hire houses in advance near the forum, as though they were about to run for office. (Life of Pompey, 66.) Caesar’s narrative says: They contended with each other openly about rewards and priesthoods and disposed of the consulship for years to come. Some demanded the houses and goods of men in Caesar’s camp, and there was a great controversy over the question whether Lucius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompey on a mission to the Parthians, should have the right to stand for the next praetorship while absent. . . . Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther had daily disputes over the succession to Caesar’s priesthood and descended to the vilest language, Lentulus claiming it on the score of age, Domitius boasting of his influence in the city and his dignity, while Scipio trusted to his relationship with Pompey. Acutius Rufus even accused Afranius, in Pompey’s presence, of betrayal of his army, which he said had been done in Spain. (iii. 82-83.) Pompey sided with these advisers partly out of regard for the opinions of the eastern nations that were looking on, partly to prevent any harm befalling Lucius Scipio, who was still in Macedonia, but most of all because he thought that he ought to fight while his army was in high spirits. Accordingly he advanced and pitched his camp opposite to Caesar’s near Pharsalus, so that they were separated from each other by a distance of thirty stades.
Pompey’s supplies came from every quarter, for the roads, harbors, and strongholds had been so provided beforehand that food was brought to him at all times from the land, and every wind blew it to him from the sea. Caesar, on the other hand, had only what he could find with difficulty and seize by hard labor. Yet even so nobody deserted him, but all, by a kind of divine fury, longed to come to close quarters with the enemy. They considered that they, who had been trained in arms for ten years, were much superior to the new levies of Pompey in fighting, but that for digging ditches and building fortifications and for laborious foraging they were weaker by reason of their age. Tired as they were they altogether preferred to perform some deed of valor rather than perish with hunger in inaction. Pompey perceived this and he considered it dangerous to risk everything on a single battle with disciplined and desperate men, and against the amazing luck of Caesar. It would be easier and safer to reduce them by want as they controlled no fertile territory, and could get nothing by sea, and had no ships for rapid flight. So he decided on the most prudent calculation to protract the war and wear out the enemy by hunger from day to day.Literally, to lead the enemy around from hunger to hunger, ἐς λιμὸν ἐκ λιμοῦ. Mendelssohn prefers to read ἐς λοιμὸν ἐκ λιμοῦ, from famine to plague, and he refers to Plutarch (Life of Cœsar, 40), who says that it was reported in Pompey’s camp that a pestilence had broken out in Caesar’s army in consequence of their unaccustomed diet. There is no authority for this change nor does it improve the text in any way. As Caesar was living off the country he would be obliged to move frequently from hunger to hunger.
Pompey was surrounded by a great number of senators, of equal rank with himself, by very distinguished knights, and by many kings and princes. Some of these, by reason of their inexperience in war, others because they were too much elated by the victory at Dyrrachium, others because they outnumbered the enemy, and others because they were quite tired of the war and preferred a quick decision rather than a sound one — all urged him to fight, pointing out to him that Caesar was always drawn up for battle and challenging him. Pompey answered along this very line of argument by saying that Caesar was compelled to do so by his want of supplies, and that they had the more reason to remain quiet because Caesar was pushed by necessity. Yet, harassed by the whole army, which was unduly puffed up by the victories at Dyrrachium, and by men of rank who accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order to prolong his authority over so many men of his own rank — and for this reason called him derisively king of kings and Agamemnon,Plutarch says that this nickname was bestowed upon Pompey by Domitius Ahenobarbus, the same who was sent to supersede Caesar in Gaul and who fell into the latter’s hands at Corfinium, and was dismissed with contempt. He was an intense aristocrat, enormously rich, and he hated Caesar with fury. He was killed in the pursuit after Pharsalus. During the exchange of pleasantries at Pompey’s head — quarters Afranius, who had been accused of betraying his army in Spain, when he saw Pompey trying to avoid a battle said he wondered why his accusers did not move forward and fight this huckster of provinces. Favonius, who had suggested before they left Italy that Pompey should stamp armies out of the ground, now said: Gentlemen, we shall not partake of the figs at Tusculum this year. (Life of Pompey, 67.) because that general also ruled over kings while war lasted — he allowed himself to be moved from his own purpose and gave in to them, being deceived now by the god that had misled him on other occasions during the whole of this war. He had now become, contrary to his nature, sluggish and dilatory in all things,The text, or at all events the punctuation, is here doubtful. I have followed that of Schweighäuser but his Latin version does not accord with it: Tandem a proposito se moveri passus, deo jam exitium ejus properante, concessit illorum voluntati. Quemadmodum et alias per totum illud bellum contra naturam suam, tardus fuerat et veluti torpidus, sic nunc, etc., i.e.: Finally allowing himself to be moved from his purpose he yielded to their wish, a god now hurrying him to his doom. As in other matters he had been, contrary to his nature, sluggish and as it were stupefied through this whole war, so now, etc. and he prepared for battle against his will, to his own hurt and that of the men who had persuaded him to it.
That same night three of Caesar’s legions started out to forage; for Caesar himself approved Pompey’s dilatory proceedings and had no idea that he would change, and accordingly sent them out to procure food. When he perceived that the enemy was preparing to fight he was delighted at the pressure which he conjectured had been put upon Pompey by his army, and he recalled all of his forces at once and made preparations on his own side. He offered sacrifice at midnight and invoked Mars and his own ancestress, Venus (for it was believed that from Aeneas and his son, Ilus, was descended the Julian race, with a slight change of name), and he vowed that he would build a temple in Rome as a thank-offering to her as the Bringer of Victory if everything went well. Thereupon a flame from heaven flew through the air from Caesar’s camp to Pompey’s, where it was extinguished. Pompey’s men said that it signified a brilliant victory for them over their enemies, but Caesar interpreted it as meaning that he should fall upon and extinguish the fame and power of Pompey. When Pompey was sacrificing the same night some of the victims escaped and could not be caught, and a swarm of bees settled on the altar, the type of weakness.These prodigies, with some slight variations, are related by Plutarch, by Lucan, and by Florus. Never, says Florus, were there more manifest signs of impending ruin. Shortly before daylight a panic occurred in his army. He himself went around and quieted it and then fell into a deep sleep.
When his friends aroused him he said that he had just dreamed that he had dedicated a temple in Rome to Venus the Bringer of Victory. His friends and his whole army when they heard of this were delighted, being in ignorance of Caesar’s vow, and they went about their work in a reckless and contemptuous way as though it were already accomplished. Many of them adorned their tents with laurel branches, the insignia of victory, and their slaves prepared magnificent banquets for them. Some of them began already to contend with each other for Caesar’s office of Pontifex Maximus. Pompey, being experienced in military affairs, turned away from these squabbles with concealed indignation. He remained altogether silent in hesitancy and dread, as though he were no longer commander but under command, and as though he were doing everything under compulsion and against his judgment; such dejection had come over this man of great deeds (who, until this day, had been most fortunate in every undertaking), either because he had not carried his point when he had decided what was the best course but was about to cast the die involving the safety of so many men and also involving his own reputation, until now invincible; or because some presentiment of approaching evil troubled him, presaging his complete downfall that very day from a position of such vast power. After merely saying to his friends that whichever should conquer, that day would be the beginning of great evils to the Romans for all future time, he began to make arrangements for the battle. In this remark some people thought his real intentions escaped him, involuntarily expressed in a moment of fright, and they inferred that if Pompey had been victorious he would not have laid down the supreme power.
Caesar’s army (for since many writers differ I shall follow the most credible Roman authorities, who give the most careful enumeration of the Italian soldiers, in whom they place most confidence, but do not make much account of the allied forces or record them exactly, regarding them as foreigners and as contributing to them little real assistance) consisted of about 22,000 men and of these about 1000 were cavalry. Pompey had more than double that number, of whom about 7000 were cavalry. Some of the most trustworthy writers say that 70,000 Italian soldiers were engaged in this battle. Others give the smaller number, 60,00000. Still others, grossly exaggerating, say 400,000.One of the grossly exaggerating writers is Florus, who says: Never did fortune behold so large a force of the Roman people or so much of their dignity collected in one place. More than 300,000 men were assembled on one side and the other, in addition to the auxiliaries of kings and nations. Of the whole number some say Pompey’s forces were to those of Caesar as one-and-a-half to one, others say that he had two parts out of three. So much doubt is there as to the exact truth. However that may be, each of them placed his chief reliance on his Italian troops. In the way of allied forces Caesar had cavalry from both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, besides some light-armed Greeks, consisting of Dolopians, Acarnanians, and Aetolians. Such were Caesar’s allies. Pompey had a great number from all the eastern nations, part horse, part foot. From Greece he had Lacedemonians marshalled by their own kings, and others from Peloponnesus and Bœotians with them. The Athenians marched to his aid also, although proclamation had been made on both sides that no harm should be done to them by the soldiers, since they were the priests of the Thesmophorae.The Thesmophorae (law-bringers) were Ceres and Proserpine. They were worshipped together as the goddesses of tillage and civilized life. The Thesmophoria was an annual religious festival at Athens. Nevertheless, they wished to share in the glory of the war because this was a contest for the Roman leadership.Schweighäuser says that the meaning of this passage is not quite clear to him. Combes-Dounous renders it intelligibly: They came to take part in this war merely to have the glory of fighting in a contest where the empire of the Roman people was at stake.
Besides the Greeks almost all the nations that one meets in making the circuit of the eastern sea sent aid to Pompey: Thracians, Hellespontines, Bithynians, Phrygians, Ionians, Lydians, Pamphylians, Pisidians, Paphlagonians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Hebrews, and their neighbors the Arabs, Cyprians, Rhodians, Cretan slingers, and other islanders. Kings and princes were there leading their own troops: Deïotarus, the tetrarch of Galatia in the East, and Ariarthes, king of Cappadocia. Taxiles commanded THESSALY & SOUTHERN MACEDONIA
the Armenians from the hither side of the Euphrates. Those from the other side were led by Megabates, the lieutenant of King Artabazes. Some other small princes took part with Pompey in the work. It was said that sixty ships from Egypt were contributed to him by the sovereigns of that country, Cleopatra and her brother, who was still a boy. But these did not take part in the battle, nor did any other naval force. They remained idle at Corcyra. Pompey seems to have acted very foolishly in this respect in disregarding the fleet, in which he excelled so greatly that he could have deprived the enemy of all the supplies brought to them from abroad, and in risking a battle on land with men who boasted that they were inured to every kind of toil and who were ferocious fighters. Although he had been on his guard against them at Dyrrachium, a certain spell seems to have come over him at a time when it would inure most to Caesar’s advantage. Under this spell also Pompey’s army was most nonsensically puffed up, and rendered insubordinate to its own commander, and hurried into action without previous experience in war. But this was the ordering of divine Providence to bring in the imperial power which now embraces everything.
Then each of the commanders assembled his soldiers and made an appeal to them. Pompey spoke as follows: You, my fellow soldiers, are the leaders in this task rather than the led, for while I was still desirous of wearing Caesar out by hunger you urged on this engagement. Since, therefore, you are the arbiters of the battle, conduct yourselves like those who are greatly superior in numbers. Despise the enemy as victors do the vanquished, as young men do the old, as fresh troops do those who are wearied with many toils. Fight like those who have the power and the means, and the consciousness of a good cause. We are contending for liberty and country. On our side are the laws and honorable fame, and this great number of senators and knights, against one man who has seized the government by robbery.Πρὸς ἄνδρα ἕνα λῃστεύοντα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. This might be translated in the words of Hamlet: The cutpurse of the empire and the rule. Go forward then, as you have determined to do, with good hope, keeping in vision the flight of the enemy at Dyrrachium, and the great number of their standards that we captured in one day when we defeated them there. Such was Pompey’s speech.
Caesar addressed his men as follows: My friends, we have already overcome our most formidable enemies, and are now about to encounter not hunger and want, but men. This day will decide everything. Remember what you promised me at Dyrrachium. Remember how you swore to each other in my presence that you would never leave the field except as conquerors. These men, fellow-soldiers, are the same that we met at the Pillars of Hercules, the same that we drove out of Italy. They are the same who sought to disband us without honors, without a triumph, without rewards, after the toils and struggles of ten years, after we had finished those great wars, after innumerable victories, and after we had added 400 nations in Spain, Gaul, and Britain to our country’s sway. I have not been able to prevail upon them by offering fair terms, nor to win them by benefits. You know that I dismissed them unharmed, hoping that we should obtain justice from them. Recall all these facts to your minds to-day, and if you have had any experience of me recall also my care for you, my good faith, and the generosity of my gifts to you.
Nor is it difficult for hardy and veteran soldiers to overcome new recruits who are without experience in war, and who, moreover, like boys, spurn the rules of discipline and of obedience to their commander. I learn that he was afraid and unwilling to come to an engagement. His star has already passed its zenith; he has become slow and hesitating in all his acts, and no longer commands, but obeys the orders of others. I say these things of his Italian forces only. As for his allies, do not think about them, pay no attention to them, do not fight with them at all. They are Syrian, Phrygian, and Lydian slaves, always ready for flight or servitude. I know very well, and you will presently see, that Pompey himself will not assign them any place in his line of battle. Give your attention to the Italians only, even though these allies come running around you like dogs trying to frighten you. When you have put the enemy to flight let us spare the Italians as being our own kindred, but slaughter the allies in order to strike terror into the others. Before all else, in order that I may know that you are mindful of your promise to choose victory or death, throw down the walls of your camp as you go out to battle and fill up the ditch, so that we may have no place of refuge if we do not conquer, and so that the enemy may see that we have no camp and know that we are compelled to occupy theirs.Caesar’s speech, as given in his own Commentaries, bears no resemblance to this. He exhorted the army to battle, he says, according to the military custom, and spoke of the kindness he had shown them at all times, and especially reminded them, as the soldiers themselves could bear witness, with what earnestness he had sought for peace, what efforts he had made in his conference with Vatinius, what he had endeavored to do in the negotiation with Scipio through Aulus Claudius, and how he had labored with Libo at Oricum for the privilege of sending legates. He said that he never willingly shed the blood of his soldiers, and that it was not his wish that the republic should lose one of its armies. Having spoken thus he gave the signal by trumpet to the soldiers, who were eagerly awaiting it and burning with zeal for the battle. (iii. go.) Suetonius, Florus, and Lucan mention Caesar’s appeal to his soldiers to spare their fellow-citizens in the pursuit, but Florus says it was intended only for effect. Lucan refers to Caesar’s order to demolish the fortifications of his camp before the battle. (Pharsalia, vii. 326.)
Nevertheless, after he had thus spoken Caesar detailed 2000 of his oldest men to guard the tents. The rest, as they passed out, demolished their fortification in the profoundest silence and filled up the ditch with the debris. When Pompey saw this, although some of his friends thought that it was a preparation for flight, he knew it was an exhibition of daring and groaned in spirit, that although they had with them famine, the most appropriate cure for such wild beasts, he must now meet these creatures in a hand-to-hand contest. But there was no drawing back now, his affairs being on the razor’s edge.This is a Greek proverb found in Homer, Herodotus, and several other authors, cited by Combes-Dounous, and also in Liddell and Scott’s lexicon under ξυρόν. Wherefore, leaving 4000 of his Italian troops to guard his camp, Pompey drew up the remainder between the city of Pharsalus and the river Enipeus opposite the place where Caesar was marshalling his forces. Each of them ranged his Italians in front, divided into three lines with a moderate space between them, and placed his cavalry on the wings of each division. Archers and slingers were mingled among all. Thus were the Italian troops disposed, on which each commander placed his chief reliance. The allied forces were marshalled by themselves rather for show than for use. There was great clamor and confusion of tongues among Pompey’s auxiliaries. Pompey stationed the Macedonians, Peloponnesians, Bœotians, and Athenians near the Italian legions, as he approved of their good order and quiet behavior. The rest, as Caesar had anticipated, he ordered to lie in wait by tribes outside of the line of battle, and when the engagement should become close to surround the enemy, to pursue, to do what damage they could, and to plunder Caesar’s camp, which was without defences.
The centre of Pompey’s formation was commanded by his father-in-law, Scipio, the left wing by Domitius Ahenobarbus, and the right by Lentulus. Afranius and Pompey guarded the camp.This is a strange blunder, and is inconsistent with the author’s own account of Pompey’s subsequent movements. A few lines below he says that after the line of battle was formed each commander moved about among the ranks encouraging his men, and in Sec. 81 he says that when Pompey saw the flight of his men he slowly retired to his camp. Caesar says that Pompey commanded the left wing of his army in person. Plutarch says he commanded the right wing. Of course Caesar’s testimony is to be preferred. On Caesar’s side the commanders were P. Sulla, Antony, and Cn. Domitius. Caesar took a convenient place in the tenth legion, as was his custom. When the enemy saw this they transferred, to face that legion, the best of their horse, in order to surround it if they could, by their superiority of numbers. When Caesar perceived this movement he placed 3000 of his bravest foot-soldiers in ambush and ordered them, when they should see the enemy trying to flank him, to rise, dart forward, and thrust their spears directly in the faces of the men because, as they were fresh and inexperienced and still in the bloom of youth, they could not endure injury to their faces.Caesar’s account of this manœuvre is as follows: Fearing lest his right wing should be surrounded by the greater number of the enemy’s horse he rapidly withdrew from the third line one cohort from each legion, and from these formed a fourth line and ranged them in opposition to the enemy’s cavalry and explained what he wished them to do and admonished them that the success of this day depended on their valor. (iii. 89.) He says nothing about aiming at the faces of the enemy. It is mentioned by Plutarch, by Lucan, and by Florus, but is probably a fable. Thus they laid their plans against each other, and each commander passed through the ranks of his own troops, attending to what was needful, exhorting his men to courage, and giving them the watchword, which on Caesar’s side was Venus the Victorious, and on Pompey’s Hercules the Invincible.
When all was in readiness on both sides they waited for some time in profound silence, hesitating, looking steadfastly at each other, each expecting the other to begin the battle. They were stricken with sorrow for the great host, for never before had such large Roman armies confronted the same danger together. They had pity for the valor of these men (the elite of both parties), especially because they saw Romans embattled against Romans. As the danger came nearer, the ambition that had inflamed and blinded them was extinguished, and gave place to fear. Reason purged the mad passion for glory, estimated the peril, and exposed the cause of the war, showing how two men contending with each other for supremacy had put themselves in a position where the one who should be vanquished could no longer hold even the humblest place, and how so great a number of the nobility were incurring the same risk on their account. The leaders reflected also that they, who had lately been friends and relatives by marriage, and had coöperated with each other in many ways to gain rank and power, had now drawn the sword for mutual slaughter and were leading to the same impiety those serving under them, men of the same city, of the same tribe, blood relations, and in some cases brothers against brothers. Even these circumstances were not wanting in this battle; because many unexpected things must happen when thousands of the same nation come together in the clash of arms. Reflecting on these things each of them was seized with unavailing repentance, and since this day was to decide for each whether he should be the highest or the lowest of the human race, they hesitated to begin the fight. It is said that both of them shed tears.This is a chapter of moralizing quite unusual in the writings of Appian. The view which he takes of this war, that it was merely a contest between two ambitious chieftains, instead of being one incident in a long struggle between a corrupt oligarchy and a debased democracy, was commonly held by men of letters until comparatively recent times.
While they were waiting and looking at each other the day was advancing. All the Italian troops stood motionless in their places, but when Pompey saw that his allied forces were falling into confusion by reason of the delay he feared lest the disorder should spread from them before the beginning of the battle. So he gave the signal first and Caesar reëchoed it. Straightway the trumpets, of which there were many distributed among so great a host, aroused the soldiers with their inspiring blasts, and the standard-bearers and officers put themselves in motion and exhorted their men. The latter advanced confidently to the encounter, but with stolidity and absolute silence, like men who had had experience in many similar engagements. And now, as they came nearer together, there was first a discharge of arrows and stones. Then as the cavalry were a little in advance of the infantry they charged each other. Those of Pompey prevailed and began to flank the tenth legion. Caesar then gave the signal to the cohorts in ambush and these, starting up suddenly, advanced to meet the cavalry, and with spears elevated aimed at the faces of the riders. The latter could not endure the enemy’s savagery, nor the blows on their mouths and eyes, but fled in disorder. Thereupon Caesar’s men,The text says Caesar’s horse, but Schweighäuser considers this a manifest error since Appian, in Sec. 79, says that it was the tenth legion that struck Pompey’s left flank. Caesar himself says that the six cohorts in reserve executed this decisive movement. At all events it could not have been Caesar’s horse. who had just now been afraid of being surrounded, fell upon the flank of Pompey’s infantry which was denuded of its cavalry supports.
When Pompey learned this he ordered his infantry not to advance farther, not to break the line of formation, and not to hurl the javelin, but to bring their spears to a rest and ward off the onset of the enemy. Some persons praise this order of Pompey as the best in a case where one is attacked in flank, but Caesar criticises it in his letters.There is some confusion here. Caesar says (iii. 93) that at the beginning of the battle (not after the repulse of his cavalry) Pompey ordered his soldiers not to move from their places but to await the attack and not allow their line to be broken, thinking that the space between the two armies was so great that Caesar’s men if they charged across it would come up blown. This, he continues, seems to me to have been an error on Pompey’s part, because there is a certain ardor and eagerness of spirit inborn in mankind, which is excited in the heat of battle, and which commanders ought to encourage, not repress. He says that the blows are delivered with more force, and that the spirits of the men are raised, by running, while those who stand still lose courage by reason of their immobility and become excellent targets for those charging against them. So, he says, it proved in this case, for the tenth legion, with Caesar himself, surrounded Pompey’s left wing, now deprived of cavalry, and assailed it with javelins in flank, where it stood immovable; until, finally, the assailants threw it into disorder, routed it, and this was the beginning of the victory. In the rest of the field killing and wounding of all kinds were going on, but no cry came from the scene of carnage, no lamentation from the wounded or the dying, only sighs and groans from those who were falling honorably in their tracks. The allies, who were looking at the battle as at a game, were astonished at the discipline of the combatants. So dumfounded were they that they did not dare attack Caesar’s tents, although they were guarded only by a few old men. Nor did they accomplish anything else, but stood in a kind of stupor.