Μάρκος Κάτων

Sections

1.1 – 1.3 1.4 – 1.6 1.7 – 2.1 2.2 – 2.3 2.4 – 3.2 3.3 – 3.5 3.6 – 3.8 4.1 – 4.2 4.3 – 4.4 5.1 – 5.3 5.4 – 5.6 6.1 – 6.3 7.1 – 8.1 8.2 – 8.5 8.6 – 8.8 8.9 – 9.3 9.4 – 9.6 9.7 – 10.2 10.3 – 10.5 11.1 – 11.2 11.3 – 12.2 12.3 – 12.5 13.1 – 13.3 13.4 – 13.6 13.7 – 14.2 14.3 – 15.1 15.2 – 15.3 15.4 – 16.1 16.2 – 16.4 16.5 – 17.1 17.2 – 17.4 17.5 – 17.7 18.1 – 18.2 18.3 – 19.1 19.2 – 19.4 19.5 – 20.1 20.2 – 20.4 20.5 – 20.6 20.7 – 21.1 21.2 – 21.4 21.5 – 21.7 21.8 – 22.2 22.3 – 22.5 23.1 – 23.3 23.4 – 24.1 24.2 – 24.3 24.4 – 24.6 24.7 – 25.2 25.3 – 26.1 26.2 – 26.3 27.1 – 27.3 27.4 – 27.5

İngilizce Yunanca

26.2 Cato, however, found the city by no means in a poor and lowly state, as the Romans supposed, but rather teeming with vigorous fighting men, overflowing with enormous wealth, filled with arms of every sort and with military supplies, and not a little puffed up by all this. He therefore thought it no time for the Romans to be ordering and arranging the affairs of Masinissa and the Numidians, but that unless they should repress a city which had always been their malignant foe, now that its power was so incredibly grown, they would be involved again in dangers as great as before.

26.3 Accordingly, he returned with speed to Rome, and advised the Senate that the former calamitous defeats of the Carthaginians had diminished not so much their power as their foolhardiness, and were likely to render them in the end not weaker, but more expert in war; their present contest with Numidia was but a prelude to a contest with Rome, while peace and treaty were mere names wherewith to cover their postponement of war till a fit occasion offered.